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INTRODUCTION
"[Y]ou are a disgusting piece of dirt."' Judge Steven Shutter, a
county judge in South Florida, used these words to describe a twenty-
four-year-old woman whom he labeled a terrorist2 and who was
condemned by the media.3 Aside from name-calling, Judge Shutter
raised the woman's bail from $3,500 to $25,000 when he learned the
nature of the offense, 'just in case" the woman might be able to
afford the lower bond.4  Given the strength of Judge Shutter's
animosity toward her, one might assume that Yasmin Kassima Sealey-
Doe had provided assistance to the terrorists who attacked the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Or perhaps
she had participated in some scheme to infect the population of
Broward County, Florida with anthrax?
In fact, Sealey-Doe did not participate in, assist, or abet any
terrorist activity.5 This young purported "terrorist" mailed flour and
sugar to her ex-boyfriend because she was angry about their breakup.6
The flour-sugar combination leaked out of the envelope into a postal
truck and a hamper in the annex of her building,7 leading to a day-
long decontamination effort.8 Sealey-Doe immediately confessed. 9
She faced a maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison for her ill-
considered prank.'0
While the case of Sealey-Doe is one of the more high-profile
examples of an anthrax hoaxster confronting severe repercussions,
she is hardly alone in her "crime." According to one account, more
1. Ardy Friedberg, Anthrax Hoax Guilt Denied; Powder Sent Through Mail, Police
Charge, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 27, 2001, at 4B (quoting Judge
Steven Shutter).
2. See The O'Reilly Factor: Follow-Up: Interview with Stephen Shutter, Stanley Cohen
and Spencer Cronin (Fox News Television Broadcast, Nov. 14, 2001) (providing a
transcript of an interview between Judge Shutter and television commentator Bill
O'Reilly), available at 2001 WL 5081914.
3. See id. (quoting Bill O'Reilly's suggestion that Judge Shutter should preside
over Sealey-Doe's trial because she deserves a "suitable punishment").
4. See id. (providing a transcript ofJudge Shutter's interaction with Sealey-Doe).
5. See Friedberg, supra note 1, at 4B (describing the history of Yasmin Kassima
Sealey-Doe's arrest and arraignment on charges of attempted use of a hoax weapon
of mass destruction).
6. See id. (noting that the Sealy-Doe letter was sent "at the height of the anthrax
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than 15,000 anthrax hoaxes were made between September 2001 and
August 2002." These hoaxsters contributed to a national climate of
anthrax paranoia by mailing envelopes containing flour,
2 sugar,1 3
cornstarch 4 Tylenol, 5 sand, 6 talcum powder, v body deodorant,' or,
in one case, parmesan cheese.' 9  These attacks inspired strong
rhetoric from the federal government, ° galvanized local media,2 ' and
polarized communities over the issue of how such anthrax hoaxsters
should be treated.2 These scenarios could recur if homeland security
tensions continue to escalate.
11. Wolf Blitzer Reports: Nine-Year-Old Kidnapped From California Home; Ricci
Undergoes Surgery After Suffering Aneurysm; Is Iran Sheltering al Qaeda Leaders? (Cable
News Network Television Broadcast), Aug. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0208/28/wbr.00.html.
12. SeeJon Ronson, Hoax, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 5, 2002, at 16 (considering
himself the anthrax hoax king, Clayton Lee Waagner mailed 500 letters filled with
flour to abortion clinics around the country as a hoax).
13. See Friedberg, supra note 1, at 4B (describing the contents of Sealy-Doe's
letter as a mixture of flour and sugar).
14. See Kathleen Chapman, Anthrax Prank Gets Man Fine, Service, Probation, PALM
BEACH POST, Jan. 26, 2002, at lB (reporting the story of Richard Gabrich, who sent
cornstarch to a friend in an envelope as a practical joke).
15. See Ludmilla Lelis, Deltona Boy Not Held on Anthrax; A Youth From Palm Coast
Will Be Charged with a Weapons Scare, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 27, 2001, at C3
(detailing the story of a high-school student who placed Tylenol on his teacher's desk
as a practical joke).
16. See Michael Higgins, Justice Varies in Anthrax Hoaxes Charges, Sentences Are
Inconsistent, CHI. TRB., Oct. 27, 2002, at 1 (reporting the story of Timothy Kato, who
sent sand and letters warning of anthrax to two professors).
17. Id. (mentioning the story of Pearl Rickert, who sent talcum powder to an auto
mechanic whom she thought had ripped her off).
18. See Tim McGlone, Anthrax Hoax Puts Peninsula Man in Prison for 16 Months,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), May 29, 2002, at B3 (chronicling the
story of Clifton GilchristJr., who mailed body deodorant to an insurance agent after
she had been rude to him).
19. See Cheese Prank Leads to Charges, PATRIOT-NEws (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 19,
2001, at A12 (explaining that the alleged hoaxster, Robert Kent Henderson, mailed
cheese to a colleague in California with a return address for "Mohamed").
20. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Dec. 20,
2001), available at 2001 WL 1638576 (warning that the FBI would rigorously
investigate and arrest individuals who commit "hoax crimes"). The press release
quotes FBI Director Robert Mueller as stating that the FBI "will not tolerate these
serious violations of federal law. These investigations place a severe strain on law
enforcement and public health resources and violators will be prosecuted to the
fullest extent of the law." Id.
21. See, e.g., Andrea Peyser, Nassau Finally Gets It: Hoax Is No Joke, N.Y. POST, Oct.
29, 2001, at 4 (exulting over the fact that the author of the article contributed to the
prosecutors' decision to upgrade charges against alleged anthrax hoaxster John
Rodier from misdemeanor harassment to felony falsely reporting an incident).
22. See Higgins, supra note 16, at 1 (noting disparities in anthrax hoax
sentencing).
23. John Bersia, Eliminate Smallpox As Terrorist Tool, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 7,
2002, at All. See Ceci Connolly, Homeland Bill Covers Smallpox Shot Liability, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at A13 (reporting that the Bush Administration, voicing
increased fears over the threat of a biological attack, has moved a step closer to a
voluntary national smallpox vaccination program by offering full legal protection to
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Considering the potential consequences of a real anthrax attack,
government officials have good reason to take these hoaxes seriously.
Terrorists are most likely to use the inhalation anthrax form of the
bacterium Bacillus anthracis.24 Inhalation of anthrax spores, even in
extremely low quantities, is ninety percent fatal unless the victim is
treated immediately with massive quantities of antibiotics.
2
5
Inhalation of anthrax causes fatigue, coughing, fever, and chest pains
and, if untreated, leads to death within three to twenty-four hours.26
Some experts estimate that as little as a single gram of effectively
distributed anthrax27 could kill more than one-third of the U.S.
population. 28 The appreciable dangers of anthrax poisoning played
out in October and November 2001, when letters containing actual
anthrax spores were sent through the mail, resulting in five deaths
and twenty hospitalizations.29 Jon Ronson, of Britain's The Guardian,
reflected, "If September 11 had mangled America's psyche, this
pulverized it."30  In the aftermath, U.S. lawmakers rushed to create
laws that would protect the public from real and hoax biological
weapon attacks.
Lawmakers face particular difficulty in pinpointing potential
hoaxsters because they do not fit a single profile. Hoaxsters range
manufacturers and medical personnel who administer the vaccine pursuant to a
provision in the Department of Homeland Security bill, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong.
(2002)).
24. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DIVISION OF BACTERIAL AND MYCOTIC
DISEASES, DISEASE INFORMATION: ANTHRAX (May 2, 2003), at http://www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/anthraxg.htm (on file with the American University Law
Review) (identifying three forms of anthrax as cutaneous, gastrointestinal, and
inhalation).
25. See Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe,
24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417, 433-34 (2001) (explaining the advantages and
disadvantages for a terrorist attempting to use anthrax as a weapon and designating
anthrax as the terrorist's "biological agent of choice"); see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
HEALTH, MEDLINE PLUS, MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA: ANTHRAX, at http://www.nlm.nih.
gov/medlineplus/print/ency/article/001325.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 2003) (on
file with the American University Law Review) (evaluating rate of fatality in two
stages of inhalation anthrax).
26. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, MEDLINE PLUS, MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA:
ANTHRAX, at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/ medlineplus/print/ency/article/001325.htm
(last updated Aug. 15, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
27. See Kellman, supra note 25, at 433, 437 (arguing that, if disseminated, anthrax
could get into the lungs of most people in a closed, positive air pressure
environment).
28. Id. at 433.
29. See Wayne Washington, Fighting Terror Global Impact; Anthrax Probe Raises
Doubts on FBI, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2002, at Al. Authorities continue to
investigate their prime suspect, Steven J. Hatfill, a germ warfare specialist. Id.
Nicholas D. Kristof, Anthrax Case Raises Larger Issues, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 16, 2002, at B6.
30. Ronson, supra note 12, at 16.
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from Joyce Godbout, a sixty-nine-year-old community activist, 3 to a
ten-year-old boy who wanted to get out of school for the day. Police
officers, firefighters, 4 teachers,"' city council members,36 college
students, 7 and even former prosecutors3 have been arrested for
perpetrating anthrax-related hoaxes.
These hoaxsters' motives are just as random as their collective
identities. Some suffered from mental illness,39 some perpetrated
31. See Meredith Goldstein, Lawyer Says Mental Strain Was Behind Anthrax Hoax,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2002, at Globe West 1 (explaining that Godbout's lawyer will
argue that Godbout suffered from diminished capacity resulting from the emotional
stress of prior criminal charges she faced).
32. See Sean Kelly, Anthrax Prankster, 10, Detained; Youth Who Wanted to Be Hero May
Face Felony, DENVER POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at B01 (explaining that the boy claimed that
the baby formula was anthrax so he would be declared a hero for discovering it and
would get out of school for the day), available at 2001 WL 27669476.
33. See, e.g., Not Funny, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Nov. 24, 2001, at B6 (commenting on a
Philadelphia Inquirer story reporting the arrests of two police officers for making a
false report of anthrax over their police radio); Neely Tucker, Officer on Trial in Case
of Anthrax Hoax, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2002, at B4 (detailing the arrest and trial of a
U.S. Capitol Police officer who sprinkled granules of artificial sweetener on a guard
station desk and posted a note reading, "PLEASE INHALE. YES THIS COULD BE?
CALL YOUR DOCTOR FOR FLU SYMPTOMS. THIS IS A CAPITOL POLICE
TRAINING EXERCIZE! [sic] I HOPE YOU PASS!").
34. See, e.g., John Beauge, Firefighter Ordered to Stand Trial; Man Accused of Staging
Anthrax Hoax That Cost Williamsport $11,144, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov.
14, 2001, at B12 (covering the story of Steven Welch, a Pennsylvania firefighter who
falsely claimed to be the victim of an anthrax attack).
35. See Kevin Mayhood, Anthrax Hoax Costs Teacher $150 Fine, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH,Jan. 18, 2002, at 4B (reporting that an Ohio science teacher pleaded guilty
to disorderly conduct for mailing a letter containing powdered calcium carbonate
from her school to her brother to avoid the more serious charges of inducing panic,
petty theft, and unauthorized use of property).
36. See David Slade, Councilman Says He'd Never Joke About Anthrax, ALLENTOWN
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Mar. 29, 2002, at BI (explaining that Robert
Niehoff, a 76-year-old city councilman, faced false reporting charges after telling the
secretaries at the local Borough Hall that he had gotten white powder on his clothes
while collecting the mail).
37. See, e.g., Nicholas Alajakis, Northern Illinois U. Student Faces Felony Charge for
Anthrax Joke, NORTHERN STAR (N. Ill. Univ.), Nov. 2, 2001 (reporting the arrest of a
Northern Illinois University freshman, Bryan Magnall, for allegedly leaving an
envelope filled with white powder in a school building), available at 2001 WL
29605837; DICKINSON COLLEGE EMERGENCY INFORNLTION, INFORMATION FROM MAYOR
KIRK WILSON, at http://www.dickinson.edu/contact/20011031.html (Oct. 31, 2001)
(on file with the American University Law Review) (detailing the arrest of a
Dickinson College senior who was accused of filling envelopes with a baking soda-like
substance and inserting a note reading, "You now have anthrax; prepare to die," near
the campus mailroom).
38. See Carlos Sadovi, Ex-Prosecutor in Court in Anthrax Hoax; Freed Without Bond;
Scare Was Allegedly Aimed at Colleague, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at 14 (explaining
that James Vasselli, a former prosecutor, was arrested on charges of felony disorderly
conduct for allegedly placing a suspicious letter on a colleague's desk).
39. See, e.g., Jean Lacoe, Terror of the Mind, WILKES-BARRE TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-
Barre, Pa.), Mar. 3, 2002, at IA (reporting the story of Emily Forman, a Wilkes-Barre
woman who pleaded guilty to mailing a suspicious substance and who was the victim
of childhood physical and sexual abuse and suffered from bipolar disorder), available
at 2002 WL 7759278. Forman claimed that she participated in an anthrax hoax with
[Vol. 54:1
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their hoax out of a need for personal revenge," some viewed their
crimes as a political statement,4' and some simply intended to commit
nothing more than a practicaljoke. One person apparently made a
false report to police officials because he wanted to be deported to• 43
India.
In response to this hoax epidemic, state and federal prosecutors
have promised to punish all anthrax hoaxsters severely. 4 Recent
examples highlight how certain responses have succeeded more than
others:
Three Bloomington, Illinois women were arrested in the fall of
2001, during the height of the anthrax scare, for filling an envelope
with crushed candy and leaving it at a local auto parts store.45 The
women later said they were playing a practical joke, but the
authorities took it seriously, charging the perpetrators with felony
disorderly conduct.46 All three women pleaded guilty to a reduced
charge of misdemeanor attempted disorderly conduct involving a
false biological contaminant and received a stayed 180-day jail
her roommate, Rosemary Zavrel, at Zavrel's insistence and under the influence of
her bipolar disorder. Id. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing
Zavrel s case).
40. See Friedberg, supra note 1, at 4B (revealing that the defendant in that case
sent a hoax anthrax letter because she was angry with her ex-boyfriend).
41. See, e.g., Kristen Babiracki, Anthrax Unfolds Near USC, DAILY TROJAN (Univ. of
S. Cal.), Mar. 21, 2002 (reporting an anthrax hoax perpetrated against the California
Chicano News Media Association as part of a hate letter campaign), available at 2002
WL 16983811; Denes Husty, Planned Parenthood Picketed, NEwS-PRESS (Ft. Myers, Fla.),
Mar. 21, 2002, at 2B (discussing the impact of anthrax threats to Planned
Parenthood clinics from anti-abortion crusaders such as Clayton Lee Waagner),
available at 2002 WL 16582276.
42. See, e.g., fla. Man Sentenced for Anthrax Hoax, AP ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 16390521 (reporting the sentencing of Ronald Hilburn, a
Florida tennis professional who sprinkled flour over a basket of Halloween candy as a
joke). Hilburn was sentenced to two years probation, fined $1,000, ordered to serve
100 hours of community service, and ordered to apologize to the children and
families who had been frightened by the hoax. Id.
43. See Patricia Hurtado, Deportation Aim of Hoax, Police Say, PATRIOT-NEwS
(Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov. 8, 2001, at A17 (noting that the defendant in the case, Nixon
Saldanha, who came to the United States in 1997 on a visitor's visa, faces a ten-year
sentence in a federal prison rather than being deported to Bombay). Other anthrax
hoaxsters do face deportation for their pranks. See Los Angeles Man to Be Deported for
Mailing Anthrax Threat, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2002, at B4 (reporting that Justo Saldana,
an illegal immigrant who allegedly mailed an anthrax threat to the Long Beach City
Hall as a practical joke, will be turned over to the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service for deportation to Mexico).
44. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; Martin Kasindorf & Toni Locy,
Anthrax Hoaxes Persist Despite Arrests; Angry Prosecutors Seeking Jail Time for Pranks,
Threats, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 2001, at A01 (noting that the number of imitation
anthrax crimes is increasing despite state efforts to prosecute the perpetrators).
45. Steve Silverman, Fake-Anthrax Defendants Sentenced, PANTAGRAPH
(Bloomington, Ill.),June 8, 2002, at A3.
46. Id.
2004]
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sentence.4 The McLean County Circuit Court ordered the women to
pay more than $5,000 in restitution to the U.S. Postal Service and to
local police for the costs of the investigation. 8
A Pennsylvania woman, Rosemary Zavrel, was convicted in June
2002 on federal charges of mailing threatening letters, aiding and
abetting in mailing threatening letters, making false statements to the
police, and for trying to mail anthrax hoax letters to government
officials. 9 She and a friend, Emily Foreman, mailed seventeen letters
in an attempt to frame two teens who were picking on Zavrel's son.50
While the maximum sentence for each charge was five years in
prison,5' Zavrel and Foreman received thirty months and fourteen
months, respectively.
52
Another Pennsylvania resident, Robert LarryJacoby, Jr., phoned in
three fake bomb and anthrax scares to the Lehigh County
Courthouse. After pleading guilty to three counts each of making
terroristic threats and bomb threats, he was sentenced to ten to
twenty-seven years in state prison. The judge justified the harsh
sentence because of the precarious situation the threats had imposed
on the entire county's court system and emergency management
personnel. In response,Jacoby's attorney remarked,
I can tell you personally, because I was in court on those days, that
nobody felt threatened or traumatized.... This wasn't a bin Laden
type of thing where he struck fear in the hearts of the city. It was a
stupid hoax, and he got the max for it. He has some time to do, he
should be punished. But I've seen people slit throats and get less.54
In Texas, Dustin Limberg sent fake anthrax to intimidate a girl who
was going to testify against him. 5  After pleading guilty to a
misdemeanor charge of harassing a witness, a charge that was
47. id.
48. Id.
49. Associated Press, Woman Found Guilty in Anthrax Hoax, July 13, 2002, available
at http://www.anthrax investigation.com/hoaxes.html#ap020713 (explaining that
the women tried to mail their cornstarch-filled letters to President Bush, local judges,
and other authorities).
50. See id. (stating that the envelopes were marked with the return addresses of
the two boys).
51. Id.
52. Women Sentenced for Mailing Fake Anthrax, AP ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2003, available at
2003 WL 11479378. In a 2-1 decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions.
United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2004).
53. Jimmy P. Miller, Man Gets Max for Anthrax Threat, ExPRESS-TIMES (Easton, Pa.),
Aug. 27, 2002, available at http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/hoaxes.html#et028
27.
54. Id.
55. See Brian Barber, One-Year Sentence Levied for Bogus Anthrax Threat Maker, TULSA
WORLD (Tulsa, Okla.), June 15, 2002, at A14 (explaining that a seventeen-year-old
Texas girl was testifying against him in a stolen car case).
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negotiated down from threatening to use a weapon of mass
destruction,6 he was sentenced to one year of probation and ordered
to complete a mental health program.57
Californian Antonio Flores was sentenced to twenty-one months in
prison for mailing three hoax anthrax letters laced with Victoria's
Secret talcum powder."
In Virginia, Clifton Gilchrist sent an anthrax hoax letter to an
insurance agent who was rude to him.59 The court sentenced him to
sixteen months in prison after he pleaded guilty to mailing a
threatening letter.60 Gilchrist had faced a maximum penalty of five
years in prison and a $250,000 fine.6'
Perhaps the most famous anthrax hoaxster charged with false
reporting is James '".J." Pickett, a U.S. Capitol Police Officer. 62 On a
desk in a House of Representatives office building, Pickett had left a
pile of artificial sweetener with the words "PLEASE INHALE" on an
accompanying note.6' Even though the opened packages of
sweeteners had been left in plain view on the desk,6 Pickett was
arrested on charges of making false statements and obstructing the
police.65 Because of his occupation and the relatively innocuous
nature of his hoax,66 Pickett has emerged as a lightning rod of
controversy regarding the Justice Department's announced campaign
56. Id. The prosecutors explained that the misdemeanor plea was offered
partially because of the defendant's lack of access to real anthrax and the fact that
the envelope had been detected before it entered the mail system. Id.
57. See id. (describing the sentence given by the federal judge).
58. Agence France Presse, California Man Sentenced in Triple Anthrax Hoaxes, June
14, 2002, at § Domestic, non-Washington, General News (reporting that the
defendant sent three letters containing threats such as "ANTHRAX you're gonna
Die!" and "I will Kill You... Soon.").
59. See McCormick Inducted as a Virginia Legend, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
(Richmond, Va.), May 30, 2002, at B2 (reporting that, after the hoax, the mail carrier
who handled the letter had to be decontaminated and was prescribed anti-anthrax
medication), available at 2002 WL 7201135.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. SeeJim Oliphant, Anthrax Joke: Nobody's Laughing, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002,
at 1 (investigating the furor over Pickett's arrest and future trial).
63. See id. (stating that everyone at the scene knew that Pickett had written the
note, which read, "PLEASE INHALE. YES COULD THIS BE? CALL YOUR DOCTOR
FOR FLU-SYMPTOMS. THIS IS A CAPITOL POLICE TRAINING EXERCIZE! [sic]
I HOPE YOU PASS!").
64. SeeJim Abrams, Cop May Face Jail Over Anthrax Hoax, AP ONLINE, Apr. 5, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 18179974 (reporting that Pickett contends that torn packets of
artificial sweetener were in clear view on the police post desk).
65. See id. (noting that, if convicted, Pickett could serve up to five years in prison
and be fined up to $250,000).
66. See Oliphant, supra note 62, at I (pointing out that all parties involved quickly
realized the nature of the hoax, that Pickett immediately admitted to the hoax, and
that Pickett had a reputation as a practical joker).
2004]
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to prosecute any and all hoax crimes to the fullest extent of the law. 67
While at the district court level Pickett received no jail time and just
68two years probation for making false statements, recently his
conviction was overturned on appeal.69 The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that, to be convicted for making
false statements, those statements must be made in connection with
an ongoing investigation.7 °
While prosecutors struggle to stretch laws to fit the facts of these
false reports and hoax crimes,7" federal and state legislators are both
amending existing laws to be more effective and severe and creating
new laws to deal with the problems of hoax crimes.2 State legislators
have taken the lead in enacting statutes that purport to be fair and
productive tools for prosecuting and deterring such hoaxes;
73
however, many states-in the panicked heat of the moment-have
left out important components in their terror hoax statutes, 4 making
the successful and fair prosecution of offenders a difficult task.
75
This Article considers whether hoax legislation should be a state or
federal matter,76 reviews federal and state statutes used to prosecute
anthrax hoax crimes before September 11, 77 analyzes legislation
introduced in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11,78 and
recommends a model hoax crime statute.79  While the Article
compares state and federal legislation, it focuses primarily on state
legislation, because such legislation has incorporated more
innovative approaches. This is not to say, however, that anthrax hoax
crime legislation should be a state matter rather than a federal
concern. A sweeping federal bill would ensure uniformity in
67. See id. (outlining the major legal concerns at issue in this case).
68. See Neely Tucker, Officer Sentenced for Anthrax Prank, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
2003, at A2 (convicting him for false reporting, the judge suspended his probation
while the conviction was appealed).
69. United States v. Pickett, 353 F.3d 62 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Neely Tucker,
Officer's Conviction Overturned in Anthrax Prank, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2004, at B3.
70. See Pickett, 353 F.3d at 68-69.
71. See Kasindorf & Locy, supra note 44, at Al (noting that "[b]ioterrorism
pranks and threats continue to vex authorities" despite promises by Attorney General
John Ashcroft to "crack down" on such crimes).
72. See infra Parts II.C and III.C.
73. See infra Part III.C.
74. See infra Part IV.C.
75. See Andy Thibault, One FederalJudge Stands Up, CONN. L. TRIB.,June 2, 2003, at
18 (reporting that U.S. District Judge Alfred Covello refused to impose the jail
sentence that U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft wanted for falsely reporting an
anthrax hoax), available at 6/2/2003 CTLAWTRIB 18 (WESTLAW).
76. See infra Parts II.A and III.A.
77. See infra Parts II.B and III.B.
78. See infra Part III.C.
79. See infra Part V.
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interpretation and implementation by creating a national web to trap
hoax perpetrators regardless of where they commit their crimes."s
The Article concludes with a recommendation that the federal
government adopt a hoax crime statute that includes a mens rea
requirement based on the mindset of the perpetrator and three
separate acti rei-false reports, hoaxes, and terroristic threats-with
punishment tailored to the perpetrator's actual mens rea. Regardless
of whether the federal government adopts these laws, the states
should employ statutes that are based on this formulation.
I. FEDERAL HOAX CRIME LEGISLATION
A. Constitutional Powers Justifying a Federal Hoax Crime Bill
1. Introduction
As an initial matter, one must determine the level of government
from which hoax legislation should originate.1 Criminal legislation
at the federal level is controversial because creating and enforcing
criminal law traditionally has resided with the states. 2 To circumvent
this tradition, the federal government must base its criminal
legislation on one of its enumerated powers in the Constitution.
Although both state and federal legislators have drafted statutes to
deter and punish terrorist activities, it makes most sense for the
federal government to adopt a federal universal hoax crime statute to
ensure uniformity in the prosecution of hoax perpetrators. Provided
80. This bill mirrors the proposed national response plan under the Department
of Homeland Security bill, which encourages cooperation among state law
enforcement operations.
81. James Madison stated in the Federalist Papers that the powers of the federal
government are few and defined, whereas "[t]he powers reserved to the several
States extend to all objects that, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the States." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed. 1961). In apparent contradiction to Madison's assertion, recent federal
criminal legislation significantly blurs the line between federal and state
prosecutorial powers. For example, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) allows a state substantive offense to be charged as a
federal crime when part of an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1968 (2002).
Academics criticize such a federalization of criminal law as an inappropriate
assertion of federal power over the domain of state regulation. See Sanford Kadish,
The Folly of Ovefederalization, 46 HAsTINGs L.J. 1247, 1248 (1995) (arguing that the
expansion of federal authority in criminal matters, turning traditional state offenses
into federal ones, raises serious cause for concern); see also Robert H. Bork & Daniel
E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUn. POL'Y 849, 854 (2002) (discussing the basis of criminal laws in the
Commerce Clause).
82. See Bork & Troy, supra note 81, at 891.
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that it withstands constitutional scrutiny, a federal hoax crime law
would trump comparable state legislation. 3
2. United States v. Lopez: Limits of the Commerce Clause as justification
for a federal hoax crime bill
For most of the 20th century, courts construed the Commerce
Clause 4 as giving Congress broad authority to regulate activities,
including criminal conduct, that traditionally were under the
jurisdiction of the states."5 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has
limited this power.8 6 In United States v. Lopez,"7 the Supreme Court, in
1995, held that Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause power
only when regulating "the channels of interstate commerce,. . . the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... [or] activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce."88  Lopez represents a
significant break from prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which
merely required an effect on interstate commerce to justify federal
legislation.5 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Lopez in 2000, in United
83. See infra Parts II.A.2-II.A.4 (suggesting that the federal government can justify
such national anti-terrorism legislation based on its Commerce Clause power).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress with the power to regulate
commerce "among" states).
85. See Bork & Troy, supra note 81, at 881-83 (discussing the history of the
Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court's varying interpretation of the clause's
scope).
86. See Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium: "Yes"
to Broad Congressional Control Over Commercial Transactions; "No" to Federal Legislation on
Social and Cultural Issues, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2003) (arguing that, following
Lopez, the Court returned to a narrow understanding of the Commerce Clause,
holding that the clause applies only to the "channels" and "instrumentalities" of
interstate commerce and to those "activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce").
87. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
88. Id. at 558-59.
89. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (expanding the Commerce
Clause to include activities that, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce); see also
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964) (holding that congressional power
in the field of commerce is so broad and sweeping that, where Congress keeps within
its sphere and violates no express constitutional limitation, the Supreme Court will
not interfere). Indeed, cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964), which provided the lynchpin for federal civil rights statutes, may come
under heightened scrutiny following Lopez and United States v. Morrison. See Christy
H. Dral &JerryJ. Phillips, Commerce By Another Name: The Impact of United States v.
Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REv. 605, 609-12 (2001) (arguing
that Lopez and Morrison constitute a significant break from earlier Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that required only an effect on commerce, because these cases require
that there be a direct effect on either commodities traded through commerce or the
instrumentalities of commerce itself). Earlier cases had merely required that there
be a net effect on someone or something that moved across state lines or
participated either directly or indirectly in interstate commerce. See id.
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States v. Morrison.90 Therefore, any federal anti-hoax crime legislation
must be able to satisfy the criteria set forth in Lopez.
The likelihood of passage of a federal hoax crime bill on the heels
of Lopez is doubtful in light of the heightened judicial scrutiny courts
now employ when reviewing Commerce Clause issues. 9' Some
scholars even suggest that the entire federal criminal regime will
need to be reevaluated as strengthened state sovereignty92 principles
are introduced into the debate over the permissible scope of federal
criminal statutes.93 Although it is unlikely that the entirety of federal
criminal law will be reversed in the wake of Lopez and Morrison, the
level of heightened scrutiny now attached to federal legislation
requires Congress to justify intruding on matters that are traditionally
regulated by the states.
Other constitutional provisions, in concert with the Commerce
Clause, could provide justification for a federal hoax crime law.94 Any
new federal criminal legislation that uses the Commerce Clause as its
foundation will be more likely to withstand post-Lopez scrutiny if it is
tied to an explicit provision in the Constitution.95 In the hoax crime
context, Congress could point to the War Powers Clause as an
90. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not vest
Congress with the authority to enact a statute regulating gender-motivated crimes of
violence, because such crimes are not related to economic activity).
91. See David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's Rediscovery of
the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 422 (1996) (pointing to justice Thomas's
concurrence in Lopez for its discussion of the Tenth Amendment and the permissible
extent of federal power). Mayer's predictions held true when the Supreme Couct
followed the majority opinion in Lopez when deciding Morrison.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people").
93. See Kadish, supra note 81, at 1250 (suggesting the use of a test developed by
Professors Zimring and Hawkins as a possible justification for developing federal
crimes: (i) where the federal interest is stronger and more direct than the interest of
the states-for example, where the national government has a proprietary interest, as
with counterfeiting, tax evasion, assault on a federal officer, espionage, national
security legislation, etc.; (ii) where federal agencies enjoy a distinct comparative
advantage in detecting, gathering evidence, and prosecuting, as in the case of
organized crime; or (iii) where state and local law enforcement prove to be
demonstrably inadequate to control some objectionable conduct). Kadish
concluded by stating that the pattern of congressional overcriminalization is obvious
under this test, as crimes such as carjacking, domestic violence, and guns in schools
would scarcely pass muster. Id.
94. See George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption ?-Mail Fraud, State
Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 225, 248 (1997) (arguing that,
because of the Lopez limits on the Commerce Clause, it would be useful to examine
alternative sources for congressional authority to enact a broad statute dealing with
state and local corruption).
95. Id. at 252-57 (suggesting that the mail fraud statute could likely survive Lopez's
heightened Commerce Clause scrutiny because it is attached to Congress's explicit
control over the mails).
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enumerated power justifying federal hoax crime legislation.96 The
Executive Branch could also cite the Commander-in-Chief Clause as
additional support for a federal hoax crime bill."7 Both of these
approaches necessitate that either Congress or the Bush
Administration effectively frame any anti-hoax legislation or executive
order as a response to war.98
3. Supremacy and preemption justifying a federal hoax crime bill
If federal courts are willing to recognize Congress's Commerce
Clause power to criminalize hoaxes, the next question may be
whether a federal hoax crime law would preempt similar state
legislation. When state legislation conflicts with federal legislation,
the text of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause establishes that "the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress" dictates which law
controls.'00 Rather than superseding state law, Congress could design
the federal hoax law to supplement the states' deterrence of hoax
crimes, much like the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statute10' aims to curb criminal conspiratorial
relationships, which traditionally fall under the jurisdiction of the
states. 
l1
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing that Congress has the power "[t]o declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water").
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing: "The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except
in Cases of Impeachment.").
98. Only by persuading the judiciary that civilians are indeed combatants in a
"War on Terrorism" could Congress's war powers or the Commander-in-Chief Clause
give additional textual support to anti-hoax legislation or an executive order, making
the law of war the applicable lens through which the judiciary will interpret any
federal action.
99. U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
100. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (articulating a
three-part test for determining congressional intent).
101. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1968 (2002).
102. In these situations, Congress often places a savings clause in the draft of the
federal legislation. The savings clause effectively indicates Congress's intent that the
federal law will exist side-by-side with the state regulation. See, e.g., Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2002) (providing that "nothing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or
officer performing like functions) of any state over any security or any person insofar
as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
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Nevertheless, Supremacy Clause jurisprudence indicates that a
federal hoax crime law would likely preempt similar state legislation.
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,'03 for example, the Supreme
Court held that, even though noise regulation was "deep-seated in
the police power of the States,"' 4 legislative history showed
congressional intent to preempt state law.11°5 Therefore, if state hoax
crime legislation conflicts with federal objectives, any federal hoax
crime statute found to be a legitimate exercise of the Commerce
Clause power could become the only valid regulation.
Additionally, Hines v. Davidowitz"°6 provides further support for a
federal hoax crime bill if the legislation implicates foreign policy.
0 7
Hines held that the supremacy of national power in the general field
of foreign policy and the sensitivity of the relationship between the
regulation of aliens and the conduct of foreign affairs was such that it
warranted federal preemption of existing state law.'08 The Supreme
Court espoused the principle that state law must be restrained from
violating the federal rule if it "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. ' '
Upon review of any proposed hoax crime bill, the judiciary will
ultimately determine issues of preemption."" Considering the
foregoing precedents for federal criminalization, along with the
uniquely federal interests that might warrant a uniform set of hoax
crime regulations, even the current Rehnquist Court might be willing
to encroach on traditionally guarded realms of state regulation and
police power in favor of a supreme, federal hoax crime bill.
thereunder"). But see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 898 (2000)
(StevensJ., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's opinion that the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 impliedly preempted common-law tort actions
is an improvident reading of the statute's saving clause, which, in effect, severely
limits plaintiffs' rights).
103. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
104. Id. at 638.
105. Id. at 651-53.
106. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
107. See id. at 80-81 (holding that appellant's power to legislate in the area of
foreign relations was subordinate to the federal government's power to do so under
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 67.
110. See April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State and
Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1149, 1150
(2004).
2004]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
4. Unformity as a justification for a federal hoax crime bill
When deciding whether to uphold the incorporation of state law or
the fashioning of new federal law, the Supreme Court balances the
need for federal uniformity and special rules to protect federal
interests against the disruption that could result from creating new
federal legal rules."' In the past, the Supreme Court has created
federal case law in spite of controlling state precedent."12 In Clearfield
Trust v. United States,"3 for example, the Court held that some areas of
regulation require federally imposed uniformity.'l 4 Because a federal
hoax crime bill seeks to create a national standard for security, the
same policy considerations seen in Clearfield Trust are likely to arise
when drafting a federal hoax crime bill. Furthermore, in United States
v. Kimbell Foods, "5 the Supreme Court held that, because a federal lien
affects the entire nation, regulations must be uniform."16 The Court
held that it would use federal law in circumstances in which state law
frustrates the specific objectives of federal programs."' The same
guidelines could apply in a conflict-of-laws situation in which there is
a unique federal interest in curbing hoax crimes, but in which state
anti-hoax legislation presently controls.
Even staunch federalist Justices recognize that some areas warrant
federal regulation, despite the fact that the regulation overlaps with
the states' police powers."" For example, in Evans v. United States,"9
Justice Thomas, interpreting the Hobbs Act, 20 stated that "[o]ur
111. See Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United
States' Experience, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1081, 1089 (1986) (indicating that the Court
supports uniform legislation regulating transportation systems).
112. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding
that, although state law sometimes provides appropriate rules, the issuance of
commercial paper is best served by a uniform rule).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 367.
115. 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979). In Kimbel1l the Court held that, when Congress has
not spoken in an area comprising issues substantially related to an established
program of government operation, Clearfield directs federal courts to fill the
interstices of federal legislation according to their own standards. Id.
116. See id. at 726-27 (holding that, when government activities arisc from and
bear heavily upon a federal program, federal interests are sufficiently implicated to
warrant the protection of federal law).
117. Id.
118. See Brown, supra note 94, at 249 (noting that federalist judges recognize
precedent that suggests that Congress has broad power in creating legislation
concerning areas traditionally regulated by the states).
119. 504 U.S. 255, 291-92 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
has broad discretion to regulate in areas traditionally regulated by the states,
although in sensitive areas there should be a narrow construction of such regulations
since there is a possibility that they will impinge on the states and offend federalism
concerns).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2002) (prohibiting actual or attempted robbery or extortion
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of the manner or degree).
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precedents, to be sure, suggest that Congress enjoys broad
constitutional power to legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the
States-power that apparently extends even to the direct regulation
of the qualifications, tenure, and conduct of state government
officials." 12 Justice Thomas' dissent in Evans indicates the lengths to
which conservative Justices may be willing to go in interpreting
federal regulation of state activities. As such, the federal judiciary is
not likely to have qualms with a federal hoax crime bill that seeks to
unify prosecutorial power post-September 11.
B. Federal Hoax Crime Legislation Before September 11, 2001
Prior to September 11, the federal government relied primarily on
four statutes 22 for prosecuting hoax crimes relating to weapons of
mass destruction. 1
23
1. 18 US.C. § 2332a
Very little has been written about the applicability of the first of
these four statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a ("Use of certain weapons of
mass destruction") to hoax crimes. 2 4 The offense was codified as part
of the "Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, ' 125 a
sweeping Act intended to promote police recruitment and training
and encourage new programs and technologies to assist the
government in the prevention of crime.126 Section 2332a provides
remedies for the "use, threatened use, or attempted use, of a weapon
of mass destruction.'
'127
121. Evans, 504 U.S. at 291 (1992) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-54 (1985)). Although this statement by Justice Thomas
preceded Lopez, there has been no clear indication that his language in Evans is an
aberration or that he has changed his position in relation to the federalism concerns
implicit in both Lopez and Evans.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2002); 18 U.S.C. §§ 175-78 (2002);
18 U.S.C. § 229 (2002).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding
the conviction of defendants for knowingly and intentionally threatening, via email,
to use weapons of mass destruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a); United States
v. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433, 433 (7th Cir. 1999) (sustaining the defendant's conviction for"possession of a toxin for use as a weapon" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 175(a)); United
States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming the conviction of
Turner for delivering a written communication containing a threat to the U.S. Postal
Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876).
124. See, e.g., Kellman, supra note 25, at 466 (noting that it is not clear whether §
2332a applies to hoax crimes); see also Heather A. Dagen, Comment, Bioterrorism:
Perfectly Legal, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 535, 539 (2000) (noting that recent anti-terrorism
laws still have many gaps).
125. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
126. Id. § 10002.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2002). Congress made minor amendments to this section
in 1996, see Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 511 (c), Pub.
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Section 2332a contains two distinct provisions. Subsection (a)
pertains to offenses involving weapons of mass destruction within the
United States or against a United States national. 28  This subsection
applies to any person who "uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires
to use a weapon of mass destruction.' 29 When the attack is against
any person within the United States, the statute explicitly requires
that the offense "affect interstate or foreign commerce."'3  The
statute also applies when the attack affects property "owned, leased or
used by the United States or by any department or agency of the
United States, whether the property is within or outside of the United
States."'3' Subsection (b) applies to any U.S. national who uses,
threatens, attempts, or conspires to use a weapon of mass destruction
"without lawful authority"'' 32 outside the United States. 3  Both
subsections carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or, if any
victim dies, capital punishment. '34
Since its implementation, § 2332a has been used in only a handful
of cases, 35 most famously in the trial of the Oklahoma City bomber,
Timothy McVeigh.' Prior to the anthrax scares of 2001, the
L. No. 104-132, § 725, 11 Stat. 1214, 1300 (1996), Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 605(m), 110
Stat. 3488, 3510 (1996); in 1998, see Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 201(b)(1), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); and in 2002, see
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 231 (d) (1), 116 Stat. 594, 662 (2002).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a).
129. Id.
130. Id. at (a)(2).
131. Id. at (a) (3).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b).
133. Id.
134. Id. at (a), (b).
135. Currently, appellate courts have addressed only twelve claims involving a
charge under § 2332a. See United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 147 (5th Cir. 2000)
(charging defendants with sending threatening e-mails to the FBI); United States v.
Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (charging defendants with threatening to
detonate a bomb in political protest of affairs between Israel and Palestine); United
States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998) (charging defendant with
destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City); United
States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1998) (charging defendant with
placing a bomb on federal grounds); United States v. Polk, 118 F.3d 286, 291 (5th
Cir. 1997) (charging defendant with attempting to destroy an IRS building); United
States v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (charging defendant
with "participating in a global terrorist conspiracy"); United States v. Nichols, 132 F.
Supp. 2d 931, 932 (D. Colo. 2001), affd, 38 Fed. Appx. 534 (10th Cir. 2002)
(charging defendant with conspiring to destroy the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City); United States v. Slaughter, 116 F. Supp. 2d 688, 689
(W.D. Va. 2000) (charging defendant with sending hoax anthrax letters in the mail);
United States v. Yousef, 925 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (charging
defendants with attempting to destroy aircraft in foreign air commerce).
136. See United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Colo. 1996), affd sub
nom. United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming
conviction of Timothy McVeigh under § 2332a(a) (2)-(3)); see also Stephen Jones &
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government prosecuted hoaxsters sparingly under the statute. 37 This
policy changed, however, after the outbreak of anthrax in Florida and
Connecticut and the ensuing wave of anthrax hoaxes. Subsection (a)
of the statute is now becoming a major tool for federal prosecutors
seeking to punish hoax pranksters." 8
Section 2332a has only recently come into frequent use, however;
consequently, the extent and nature of problems associated with it
remain unclear. The statute has not yet been challenged on First
Amendment39 or due process, grounds and was held to be
constitutional as applied in the lone federal district court case in
which the statute's constitutionality was challenged on Commerce
Clause grounds. 140 Likewise, the statutory requirement that the use,
or potential use, of a weapon of mass destruction affect interstate
commerce has been upheld even where the threat was conveyed via e-
mail. 141
United States v. Slaughter, 142 however, provides an interesting
example of the limitations of the statute. In Slaughter, a prison
inmate sent a threatening letter containing a white powder designed
to mimic anthrax to the deputy state prosecutor who was responsible
for his incarceration. 143  The United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia set aside the defendant's conviction for
Jennifer Gideon, United States v. McVeigh: Defending the "Most Hated Man in
America", 51 OKLA. L. REV. 617 (1998) (chronicling the McVeigh case from the
perspective of defense counsel).
137. See, e.g., Bill Wallace, Hayward Man Charged in Anthrax Scare: Hoax Call from
Packing Company Where He Worked in Newark, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1999, at A13
(documenting the first anthrax hoax in northern California and the hoaxster's
subsequent charge under § 2332a); David Rosenzweig, Accountant Fined for Anthrax
Hoax, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at B3 (covering the trial and sentencing of Harvey
Craig Spelkin for perpetrating an anthrax hoax to avoid an appearance in
bankruptcy court). Prior to the Spelkin case, it was not clear whether § 2332a
applied to hoaxes at all. See id. (explaining that Spelkin's attorneys argued that the
law was not intended to apply to hoaxes).
138. See, e.g., Rebecca Carr, The Anthrax Scare: Hoaxes Are Rattling a Nation;
Pranksters Will Be Punished, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Oct. 17, 2001, at A6 (listing a
variety of defendants charged with threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction
for perpetrating anthrax hoaxes); see also Anthrax Hoax, BROADcAST NEWS, Jan. 29,
2002 (reporting the conviction of Robert Gibson on the charge of threatening to use
a weapon of mass destruction for sending envelopes with white powder, claiming
they were contaminated with anthrax, to Home Depot stores, apparently in
retaliation for being fired from the store the year before), available at 2002 WL
10951215.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech").
140. See McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. at 1575-77 (reasoning that the consequences of the
defendant's attack would range far beyond local interests and therefore had the
requisite impact on interstate commerce).
141. See Wise, 221 F.3d at 150 (upholding indictment for violation of § 2332a).
142. 116 F. Supp. 2d 688 (W.D. Va. 2000).
143. Id. at 689-91.
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threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction on the ground that
the defendant's letter would not affect a "tangible component of
interstate commerce.' 44 The court reasoned that the letter did not
directly affect interstate commerce because it was directed toward a
person rather than toward a business or "other obvious component of
interstate commerce, '  and that no concrete evidence could be
shown that the deployment of federal agents to deal with the
outbreak of anthrax would deplete the assets of the federal
government. 1
46
The court's ruling in Slaughter reveals a potential weakness in the
use of § 2332a. Where the threatened use of a weapon of mass
destruction is directed toward a person inside a single state, the
threat may not involve sufficient federal resources to satisfy the
statute's commerce requirement.4 This hidden shortcoming may
confer leverage to the defendant, in some instances allowing him or
her to plea bargain the more severe charge of threatening the use of
a weapon of mass destruction down to a lesser charge. At a
minimum, federal prosecutors must search for some connection
144. Id. at 692.
145. See id. (noting that additional threats against the Kentucky Educational
Television station also would not have affected a component of interstate
commerce).
146. See id. (explaining that the government failed to show a likelihood that
interstate commerce would be affected by a military response to an actual anthrax
threat).
147. But see id. at 693 (limiting the court's holding to the narrowness of the facts
before it due to the lack of evidence presented by the government). The court
further stated:
It is possible that the use of a weapon of mass destruction, unlike other
crimes, would be of such magnitude that every instance would require the
response of specially trained government agents being dispatched across
state lines to address the problem. In that case, the effect on interstate
commerce caused by the agents' emergency travel would be a more direct
result of the criminal activity than a federal agent that crossed state lines
merely to investigate a crime.
Id. Given the cost of investigation and preventative treatment for anthrax-related
hoaxes demonstrated since the court's ruling in Slaughter, the court's dicta in this
case may prove more persuasive in the long run than its actual holding.
148. See, e.g., David Harper, Anthrax Hoax Count Reduced, TuLSA WORLD (Tulsa,
Okla.), Mar. 2, 2002, at A1O (reporting the story of an anthrax hoaxster whose
charge of threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction was reduced to
misdemeanor harassing a witness). The defendant in this case, Dustin Wade
Limberg, attempted to mail his girlfriend a note with the phrase, "You got anthrax
now," in an envelope containing sugar. Id. Prosecutors initially charged Limberg
with violating § 2332a, but later reduced the charges, at least in part because of the
difficulty of showing an impact on interstate commerce. See id. (quoting U.S.
Attorney David O'Meilia as admitting that proving Limberg had affected interstate
commerce "might have been problematic").
[Vol. 54:1
2004] ANTHRAX HOAXES
between the hoaxster's conduct and interstate commerce to justify
the use of the statute.
149
2. 18 U.S.C. § 876
Many anthrax hoaxsters have been prosecuted under the second of
the four statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 876 ("Mailing Threatening
Communications"). 50  This statute provides that any person who
"deposits or causes to be delivered"15' any communication containing
a "threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another"'52 shall
be imprisoned for up to five years or fined a maximum of $1,000, or
both.153 The statute requires only that the government show that the
defendant wrote a threatening letter and knowingly caused the letter
to be forwarded by the U.S. Postal Service. 54 The offender need not
149. See, e.g., William J. Gorta, Powder Hoax May Mean Life Sentence, N.Y. POST, Oct.
20, 2001, at 6 (reporting the prosecution's justification of a charge under § 2332a on
the theory that the defendant's hoax affected interstate commerce by forcing a bank
to close). The defendant had placed baby powder in a co-worker's pay envelope as a
practical joke, only to be charged with threatening the use of a weapon of mass
destruction after the co-worker opened the envelope and spilled some of the powder
in a nearby bank. Id.
150. See, e.g., Ex-Postal Worker Pleads Guilty, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Jan.
27, 2002, at B6 (covering the conviction of Sharon Ann Watson-Collins for sprinkling
baby powder inside a piece of bulk mail); Karl Fischer, Anthrax Hoax Case Proceeds in
L.A., CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Jan. 10, 2002, at A3 (discussing the
indictment of Israel Rodriguez for mailing a letter containing baking soda to the
Internal Revenue Service); Grand Jury Indicts Man in Anthrax Mail Hoax, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 8, 2001, at 24A (reporting the circumstances surrounding the arrest of
William 0. Holden for sending a fake anthrax package out of a local Mail Boxes, Etc.
store); J.M. Lawrence, Accused Anthrax Hoaxsters Indicted, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 2,
2001, at 6 (reporting the indictment of a prison inmate who sent hoax letters
containing a white powder to several people); Tim McGlone, FBI Charges Man with
Using Mail in Anthrax Hoax: Unhappy-Customer Query Led to Man's Arrest, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Nov. 9, 2001, at B9 (discussing the story of
Clifton Gilchrist Jr., who was arrested for sending a fake anthrax letter to an
automobile insurance salesman he did not like); Sacramento Man Is Accused of
Perpetrating Anthrax Hoax, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 16, 2001, at A12 (reporting
the arrest of Mark Van Pelt for enclosing "pinkish-brown powder" and a note stating
"Gotcha!" with his phone bill payment); Jeff Shields, Student Accused in Anthrax Hoax:
Powdered Letter Sent to Romantic Rival, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 22,
2001, at lB (focusing on the story of Melinda Rosemarie Smith, arrested for sending
hoax anthrax letters to intimidate her romantic competitor); State Briefs, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Nov. 10, 2001, at 7A (recounting the
arrest of Burley R. Bragg for sending threatening letters referencing anthrax to the
Department of Veterans Affairs in Huntington), available at 2001 WL 6698864; Trial
Set forApril 9 in Anthrax Hoax Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 5, 2002, at 18A.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 876.
152. Id.
153. See id. (differentiating this offense from delivering any communication
containing a threat to kidnap or injure a person made with the intent to extort
money or some other thing of value, which carries a maximum penalty of twenty
years in prison).
154. See United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 463 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) ("A person
violates 18 U.S.C. § 876 by writing a threatening letter and knowingly causing it to be
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have authored the threatening communication, 155 nor must he or she
have been able actually to carry out the -threat or even have intended
to do so. 56 Courts continue to disagree, however, about whether the
statute contains an implied intent requirement, namely that the
offender intended to threaten another.
157
The obvious problem with § 876 is its specificity-it applies only to
situations in which the U.S. Postal Service is involved, 158 making it
generally less applicable than § 2332a. While the statute has been a
useful tool in combating some recent anthrax hoaxes, 159 § 876 has
little value where the hoax is not in the form of a letter. The statute
is not intended to address hoax crimes and, therefore, is unlikely to
be of assistance to federal prosecutors in dealing with future hoaxes.
A second problem with § 876 is its mens rea requirement, which
makes it necessary that the perpetrator knowingly commit the act of
mailing threatening communications.' ° This predicament came to
the forefront in the trial of Kinley Gregg, the first person to go to trial
on charges related to an anthrax hoax after September 11.61 Gregg
deposited in the United States mails.").
155. See United States v. Davis, 926 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that,
if authorship were required, an individual could avoid prosecution under § 876 by
having someone else write a threatening letter).
156. See United States v. King, 122 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
government need not establish that a defendant reasonably anticipates success from
his or her threat).
157. Compare United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the statute requires the specific intent by the accused to threaten another,
because the term "knowingly" in the statute implies more than a "transgression of an
objective standard of acceptable behavior"), with United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d
120, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that there is no evidence that the legislature
intended § 876 to be a specific intent crime, and noting that every other circuit court
besides the Ninth Circuit has held that the offense is not a specific intent crime).
158. Threats sent through other channels of interstate commerce, such as e-mail,
can be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2000) ("Interstate
Communications"); see, e.g., Randy Ellis, Student Pleads Guilty in Anthrax Hoax, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 5, 2002, at IA (reporting the guilty plea of Mohammad Yaseen
Haider for sending anthrax threats to a former love interest through e-mail);
Newsbytes Security Week in Review, NEWSBYrES NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 1, 2002 (noting the
guilty plea of a Columbus, Ohio woman for sending threatening e-mails to President
Bush), available at 2002 WL 3447541.
159. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 14, at lB (reporting the story of Richard
Gabrich, who sent cornstarch in an envelope to a friend as a practical joke); Postal
Worker Admits Anthrax Prank, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at 18 (describing the case
of postal worker Clarence Lindsey for scrawling, "ANTRAX INCLOSED [sic]," on a
package); see also Darlene Superville, Anthrax jokes' Are Taken Very Seriously,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 2001, at 12A (providing a cursory review of recent
anthrax hoax charges, including charges levied against Murray State University
students Amy Wood and Erin Creighton for mailing a letter with powdered sugar
and pseudo-Arabic calligraphy to a friend).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 876 (prohibiting individuals from "knowingly" depositing
threatening mail).
161. See Cheryl W. Thompson, Maine Woman Acquitted in 1st Anthrax Hoax Trial,
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was charged with mailing a threatening communication after sending
an envelope laden with table salt to a friend as a practical joke.
1 62
Some of the salt seeped out of the envelope at a New Hampshire post
office, leading to federal charges against Gregg.163 She was eventually
acquitted of the charges, due to the failure of the prosecution to
prove that she intended the communication to be a threat.1 64 While
Gregg benefited from particularly helpful facts (she told her friend in
advance that she was sending the envelope, 6 the post office worker
who discovered the envelope did not panic, 166 and the substance was
167never even analyzed), the acquittal was nonetheless perceived in
the media as a blow to the government's public crusade against
anthrax hoaxes.
1 68
3. 18 U.S.C. § 175(a)
The third of the four statutes for prosecuting hoax crimes, the
"Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989," 18 U.S.C. § 175(a),
contains a provision stating that any person who "knowingly develops,
produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains or possesses any
biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon... or
attempts, threatens, or conspires to do the same"'69 will be fined,
imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both.
1 70
WASH. PosT, Feb. 22, 2002, at A3 (reviewing the history of Kinley Gregg's trial and
subsequent acquittal, stating that legal experts are uncertain how successful the
Justice Department can be in holding true to its "pledge to throw the book at those
who commit anthrax hoaxes").
162. See id. (detailing Gregg's statements that she selected salt because she
thought it would be obvious to anyone that it was salt, rather than "something that
would hang in the air and get into someone's lungs").
163. See id. (stating that the salt leaked onto a postal worker at the post office, but
the worker did not panic and the office was not evacuated).
164. See id. (attributing the jury's decision to acquit to the government's failure to
take the case seriously).
165. See Cheryl W. Thompson, Envelopes Full of Legal Controversy; Anthrax Hoax Cases
Stir Debate on Rights and Responsibilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2001, at Al (noting that
Gregg told a friend she was "sending her something amusing").
166. See Thompson, supra note 161, at A3 (quoting a juror as saying that the
prosecution's argument was undercut by the fact that the postal officer who
discovered the envelope did not "freak out").
167. See id. (claiming that the table salt Gregg enclosed in the envelope had still
not been tested by the day of her acquittal).
168. See id. (describing the Gregg verdict as a "setback for the Justice
Department's efforts to severely punish" anthrax hoaxsters).
169. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (2000).
170. Id.
20041
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This little-used statute71 has never been employed to prosecute a
person for threatened possession of a biological agent.172 Moreover,
§ 175(a) presents two disadvantages for prosecutors in comparison
with § 2332a: first, the statute requires that the offender specifically
intends that the threatened agent will be used as a weapon;173 second,
the death penalty is not authorized as a punishment for this crime.
74
4. 18 U.S.C. §229
The last of the four statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 229 ("Prohibited
Activities"), is part of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act ("CWCIA"). 7 5 The CWCIA reflected the United
States' consent to the International Chemical Weapons
Convention, 76 and it has been analyzed primarily for its affect on
commercial chemical companies. 7  However, § 229 of the Act-
which provides for a penalty for any person who threatens to use a
chemical weapon 17--has never been used to prosecute an individual
criminal defendant.
171. Only three cases involving 18 U.S.C. § 175 have been decided at the appellate
level. See United States v. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433, 435 (7th Cir. 1999) (charging
defendant with possession of numerous biological toxins); United States v. Baker, 98
F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1996) (charging defendant with possession of ricin); United
States v. Mettetal, No. CRIM.A. 3:96CR50034, 2000 WL 33232324, at *2 (W.D. Va.
June 16, 2000) (charging defendant with possession of ricin).
172. But see Man Pleads Innocent in Hoax, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.),
Oct. 30, 2001, at 7A (reporting a grand jury indictment against Terry L. Olson of
Price, Utah for "threatening to use a biological weapon and giving false
information"). It is unclear whether Olson was indicted for violating § 175 or §
2332a. See also Richard Brooks, Man Accused in Anthrax Scare, PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), Nov. 28, 2001, at B1O (reporting the arrest of Antonio Miguel
Flores of San Bernardino, California on charges of "threatening the transfer of a
biological agent for use as a weapon," but stating that the maximum penalty for this
offense is five years' imprisonment).
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) ("Whoever knowingly develops [a] ... delivery system
for use as a weapon... or attempts, threatens, or conspires to do the same ......
(emphasis added).
174. See id. (listing punishment for violating § 175(a) as a fine or imprisonment
for life or any term of years, or both).
175. See generally Barry Kellman, The Advent of International Chemical Regulation: The
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 25 J. LEGIs. 117 (1999) (explaining
the history and significance of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act).
176. See id. at 117 (stating that the Act was a result of the Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998).
177. See id. at 125 ("This discussion examines six aspects of the CWCIA with
primary focus on its implications for the commercial chemical industry .. ").
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 229A (2000) (providing for criminal and civil penalties, with
the criminal penalties including a fine or imprisonment for any term of years, or
both). The death penalty or life in prison are possible punishments if the violation
results in the death of another person. Id.
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C. Federal Hoax Crime Legislation After September 11, 2001
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, both the Senate
and the House of Representatives sponsored bills addressing hoax
crimes. Three bills, S. 1658,179 S. 1666,180 and S. 1719,18' were
introduced in the Senate1 s2 and one bill, H.R. 3209,1s3 was passed bythe H use • 184
the House of Representatives of the 107th Congress; however, none
was enacted prior to adjournment of the 107th Congress. 115
Similar bills were introduced in the 108th Congress. S. 2286 was
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee in January 2003,187 and
H.R. 1678188 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee in April
2003.189 Each of these latter bills proposed to create a new section of




In November 2001, Senator Charles Schumer introduced the first
of the Senate bills, S. 1658, the "Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001."'91
This legislation proposed a criminal penalty for knowingly engaging in
conduct "likely to impart the false impression that activity is or will
179. Anti-Hoax Terrorism Bill of 2001, S. 1658, 107th Cong. (2001).
180. Anti-Terrorist Hoax and False Report Act of 2001, S. 1666, 107th Cong.
(2001).
181. Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001, S. 1719, 107th Cong. (2001).
182. 147 CONG. REc. S1l,611 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (referring S. 1658 to the
SenateJudiciary Committee); id. at S11,612 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (referring S.1666
to the Senate Judiciary Committee); 147 CONG. REc. S12,001 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
2001) (referring S. 1719 to the SenateJudiciary Committee).
183. Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001, H.R. 3209, 107th Cong. (2001).
184. 147 CONG. REc. H9309 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2001) (recording passage of H.R.
3209 in the House by a vote of 423-0).
185. See Anti-Hoax Terrorism Bill of 2001, S. 1658, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(proposing "False Information and Hoaxes" as the title for the new statutory
provision); S. 1666 § 2 (naming the proposed amendment "Terrorist Hoaxes and
False Information"); S. 1719 § 2 (titling the proposed amendment "False
Information and Hoaxes"); H.R. 3209 § 2 (proposing title for new statutory provision
as "False Information and Hoaxes").
186. Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003, S. 22, 108th Cong.
(2003).
187. 149 CONG. REc. S35 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2003) (referring S. 22 to the Senate
Judiciary Committee).
188. The Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2003, H.R. 1678, 108th Cong. (2003)..
189. 149 CONG. REc. H2938 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2003) (referring H.R. 1678 to the
House Judiciary Committee).
190. See S. 22 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 881, "False Information and Hoaxes"); H. 1678
(creating 18 U.S.C. § 1037, "False Information and Hoaxes").
191. See S. 1658, 107th Cong. (2001) (listing the introduction of the bill on
November 8, 2001).
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take place that violates [S] ection [s] 175, 229, 831, or 2332a, [and] ...
may reasonably be expected to be believed to cause an emergency
response by governmental agencies ....,,92 The bill called for a fine
or a five-year prison term, or both, and reimbursement for any
expenses incurred as a result of the investigation of the offense. 193 It
is unclear whether the mens rea requirement was intended to apply
to the perpetrator or the victim.
b. S. 1666
On the same day that Senator Schumer introduced S. 1658,
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the "Anti-Terrorist Hoax and False
Report Act of 2001,, 194 S. 1666.195 The Act substantially resembled S.
1658, with one important exception: the bill required that an
offender of the proposed statute both knowingly and maliciously impart
false information under circumstances "likely to cause a Federal,
State, or local"'19 6 response to the purported violation of §§ 175, 229,
2332a, or 831.97 In addition, S. 1666 provided restitution for




Introduced a week after S. 1658 and S. 1666, S. 1719, the "Anti-
Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001,"' 9 was nearly identical to S. 1658. Other
than placing the new statute in Chapter 47 of the U.S. Code
("Telephones, Telegraphs, and Radiotelegraphs") ,o the only
substantial difference was that it required the mens rea of "intent to
convey false or misleading information 2 0 ' rather than merely knowing
that the information is false, which was the requirement under S.
192. Id. § 2(a).
193. Id.
194. S. 1666, 107th Cong. (2001). The title of this bill is referenced deliberately
because of its dissimilar nature to the proposed titles for the other bills addressing
this issue.
195. S. 1658; S. 1666. S. 1658 was introduced by Senator Schumer and S. 1666 was
introduced by Senator Leahy, both on November 8, 2001.
196. S. 1666, § 2(a).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See S. 1719, 107th Cong. (2001) (listing the introduction of the bill by
Senator Diane Feinstein of California on November 16, 2001).
200. Compare S. 1719, § 2(a) ("Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after section 1036 [internal citation omitted] the
following .. "), with Anti-Hoax Terrorism Bill of 2001, S. 1658, 107th Cong. § 2(a)
(2001) ("Chapter 41 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
section 880 [internal citation omitted] the following . .
201. S. 1719, § 2(a) (emphasis added).
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1658.02 Accordingly, the bill appeared to be a compromise between
S. 1658 and S. 1666, replacing the mens rea requirement of S. 1658
and the stringent scienter requirement of S. 1666 with less onerous
requirements.
d. H.R. 3209
H.R. 3209, a bill nearly identical to S. 1658, was passed by the
House of Representatives of the 107th Congress but was never
enacted. H.R. 3209, the "Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001, '2°3 was
reintroduced by Lamar Smith in the 108th Congress as H.R. 1678.204
2. 108th Congress
a. S. 22
In January 2003, Senator Thomas Daschle introduced S. 22, the
"Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003. "2o5 Much
of S. 22 resembles S. 1658. °0 S. 22, in its proposed amendment to 18
U.S.C. § 881(a)(1), prohibits any person from "imparting or
conveying or causing to be imparted or conveyed false
information, ' ,2°7 knowing the information to be false, regarding any
attempt to commit an act that would be a crime under 18 U.S.C. §§
175, 229, 831, or 2332a, and where such information may be
reasonably believed.2 °0  S. 22 does not require that the hoaxster
impart false information maliciously, but it does distinguish between
those done in jest and those done maliciously.
2 00°
202. Anti-Hoax Terrorism Bill of 2001, S. 1658, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001).
203. See 147 CONG. REC. H9309 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2001) (noting passage of the bill
on December 12, 2001 by a vote of 423-0).
204. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
205. S.22, 108th Cong. § 1403(a) (2003).
206. Compare id. (defining unlawful acts as knowingly imparting or conveying false
information of any act that would be a crime under 18 U.S.C.A. § 175, or knowingly
or intentionally transferring or distributing any device or material resembling a
weapon of mass destruction), with S. 1658 (defining a criminal violation as knowingly
engaging in any conduct that violates 18 U.S.C.A. § 175, or that may reasonably be
expected to cause an emergency response by government agencies).
207. S. 22, § 1403(a).
208. Id. (proposing an amendment that would create 18 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (1) in
Chapter 41).
209. Id. (comparing proposed amendments to § 881(a) (1) to (b) (2)).
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S. 22 also expands on the 107th Congress's anti-hoax proposals. °
Unlike the previous proposals, § 1403(a) (2) of S. 22 prohibits any
person from transferring or distributing any device or material
knowing or intending that the device or material resembles a nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapon or other weapon of mass
destruction .2 1  This proposal is constrained to situations in which it
may be reasonably believed that the material(s) may be involved in
the attempt or commission of a crime under §§ 175, 229, 831, or
2332a.212
b. H.R 1678
In April 2003, Representative Lamar Smith reintroduced H.R. 3209
of the 107th Congress as H.R. 1678, the "Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of
2003.,,21s H.R. 1678 prohibits conduct that intends to convey false or
misleading information, in circumstances in which this information
may reasonably be believed and concerns an activity that violates §§
214175, 229, 831, or 2332a. Akin to S. 22, H.R. 1678 does not require
that the hoaxster impart false information maliciously; 215 however,
H.R. 1678 requires that the hoaxster convey false or misleading
information intentionally.2
6
Regardless of which bill or a successor, if any, is ultimately enacted,
states must reconstitute their legislation to deal with any gaps in
federal statutory law.
II. STATE LEGISLATION
A. Constitutional Issues and Challenges Facing Hoax Crime Legislation
Although states can justify creating their own hoax crime
legislation under their traditional police powers, they must be
mindful of drafting legislation that meets basic standards of
210. Compare id. (amending 18 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (1) to further protect against false
information), with Anti-Hoax Terrorism Bill of 2001, S. 1658, 107th Cong. § 2(a)
(2001), Anti-Terrorist Hoax and False Report Act of 2001, S. 1666, 107th Cong.
(2001) (omitting the intent elemtent more clearly pronounced in the S. 22
amendment), and Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001, S. 1719, 107th Cong. (2001)
(including a provision criminalizing transferring or distributing a hoax device).
211. S. 22, § 1403(a) (amending Title 18, U.S. Code to include § 881 (a) (2)).
212. Id.
213. H.R. 1678, 108th Congress (2003).
214. See id. § 2(a) (creating § 1037 in Chapter 47 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code).
215. Compare S. 22, § 1403(a) (prohibiting a person from knowingly conveying
false information), with H.R. 1678 108th Cong. § 2 (a) (noting that neither bill
requires malicious intent).
216. H.R. 1678, § 2(a).
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fundamental fairness and that will withstand constitutional scrutiny. 7
Significant due process concerns will likely arise if a state decides to
draft a hoax crime bill without considering the problems with
criminalizing equally actions done in jest and those done with
218 211malice. In State v. Hamilton, for example, the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that, without such a differentiation, a hoax statute violates
the Due Process Clause. 2 0 To preempt any due process challenges,
state legislatures must consider separating hoax crime statutes into
three specific acti rei: false reports, hoaxes, and terroristic threats. 21
These statutes must further divide the crimes by incorporating into
each offense different mens rea standards, distinguishing between
222hoaxes perpetrated in jest and those done with malice.
The most salient due process challenges to future hoax crime
223legislation will likely emerge under the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
which requires that a statute reasonably inform the citizenry of
precisely what it is prohibiting.224 Challenges under this doctrine are
common when dealing with the emergence of new criminal
217. See infra Part IV.C.4 (explaining why states must focus particularly on unduly
vague and overly broad language in hoax statutes).
218. See State v. Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d 397, 398-99 (Neb. 1983) (holding that a
statute may be too vague if it does not distinguish threats made in jest from those
made in seriousness).
219. Id.
220. See id. (explaining that the use of the word "likely" in the statutory sentence"threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or serious physical injury to
another" is too vague to allow for any interpretation of what qualifies as a threat,
especially because it provides no distinction between threats made as jokes and those
made in seriousness) (emphasis added).
221. See infra Part V.B (recommending separation of state legislation into false
reports, hoaxes, and terroristic threats).
222. See infra Part V.C (discussing the division of each offense to include the
recommended mentes reae).
223. For a recent statement on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see Rogers v.
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001), which cites numerous decisions in which the
Supreme Court held criminal statutes "void for vagueness." See also United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ("The constitutional requirement of definiteness is
violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute."); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes."); Connally v. Gen. Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (declaring unconstitutional a criminal statute that was
not "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their
part will render them liable to its penalties").
224. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 457 (noting specifically that the Supreme Court has
frequently acknowledged the "basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair
warning of the conduct that it makes a crime"); see also Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (explaining that a "greater deprivation of the right to fair
notice [is produced] ... where the claim is that a statute precise on its face has been
unforeseeably and retroactively expanded by judicial construction, than in the typical,void for vagueness situation."').
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regulations.2 2 5  To avoid invalidation, legislatures must specifically
define the actus reus and mens rea elements of each offense.
B. State Hoax Crime Statutes Before September 11, 2001
While the federal government has assumed a high-profile role in
prosecuting some recent anthrax hoaxsters, 26 hoax crimes have fallen
primarily under the rubric of state control.27  Unlike federal
legislation, which is restricted to regulating interstate commerce and
protecting national interests, states may criminalize a broad range of
hoaxes, from the innocuous to the dangerous, with a variety of
2281penalties and regulatory schenes.
Historically, states punished pranks that disrupted public functions
as misdemeanors through state disorderly conduct or false alarm
statutes, 29 and punished threats that disrupt public functions or
intimidate private victims through terroristic threat statutes. 30
Recently, several states have created hoax crime laws that address
hoaxes specifically, rather than as an incidental part of a public
disruption or private threat.2 1 Prosecutors have used each of these
types of statutes to some effect against recent anthrax hoaxsters.
232
225. See Brant E. Poling, Stalking: Is the Law Hiding in the Shadows of
Constitutionality?, 23 CAP. U. L. Rrv. 279 (1994):
The Supreme Court's vagueness doctrine is one of the principal tests to
determine if a statute is constitutional. A criminal statute is void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if
the statute fails to contain ascertainable standards of guilt. The basic
principle of due process is that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. As stated by the Supreme Court:
"[T]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.
And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law."
Id. at 302-03. For example, when states began to rewrite their stalking laws, several
commentators and academics criticized bills that were not clear enough to
reasonably inform the public about what exactly was being prohibited. Id.
226. See supra Part I (detailing stories of the prosecution of anthrax hoaxsters
following September 11, 2001).
227. See infra Part III.B.3 (examining state statutes regulating hoax crimes).
228. See infra Parts III.B.1-III.B.3 (detailing state jurisdiction to prosecute a variety
of hoax crimes).
229. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing state prosecution of false reporting through
disorderly conduct types of offenses).
230. See infra Part III.B.3 (relating details on state terroristic threat statutes in
place before September 11, 2001).
231. See infra Part III.B.2 (examining state hoax statutes in existence before
September 11, 2001).
232. See infra Parts III.B.I-III.B.3 (listing the use of state disorderly conduct, hoax,
[Vol. 54:1
2004] ANTHRAX HOAXES 31
This section of the article considers these statutes with a particular
emphasis on three actus rei: false reports, hoaxes, and terroristic
threats.
1. False reporting: misdemeanor offenses for disruption of public functions
Many states continue to prosecute hoax crimes through
misdemeanor statutes that prohibit false reports or alarms, disorderly
conduct, a combination,2 s or some variation of these laws, such as
"menacing 34 or "disrupting school function" laws.23' States have used
false report statutes based on the Model Penal Code to prosecute a
wide range of anthrax hoaxsters, including a prisoner who mailed
236powder-laden envelopes to county facilities, a city councilman who
shook dust off his jacket as he entered a public building,237 and
college students who masqueraded as Osama bin Laden and
"Anthrax" for Halloween.2 38 In addition, sheriff's officials in Colorado
have sought application of the statute to a ten-year-old boy who filled
a canister with baby formula and claimed that it was anthrax.2 39
Under the Model Penal Code, a person is guilty of creating a false
report or alarm if he or she initiates or circulates a report of an
and terrorist threat statutes that were in place before September 11, 2001, in order to
prosecute recent anthrax hoaxsters).
233. See, e.g., Steve Silverman, Women Deny They Sent Fake Anthrax, PANTAGRAPH
(Bloomington, Ill.),Jan. 10, 2002, at A3 (reporting the charge of three Bloomington
women for "disorderly conduct involving the false report of a biological
contaminant").
234. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 32, at B01 (chronicling state response to anthrax
hoaxes through state felony and misdemeanor "menacing" statutes).
235. See, e.g., Eric Eyre, 2Junior High Students Charged in Anthrax Hoax, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Oct. 25, 2001, at IC (covering the arrest
of two Kanawha County students on charges of "disturbance of schools" for
perpetrating an anthrax hoax), available at 2001 WL 6696736; Jim Ross, Miles Away,
Sept. 11 Hits Home, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),Jan. 1, 2002, at I (reporting the arrest
of a Citrus High School student on a charge of disrupting a school by typing
"Anthrax is here and in this school, bye now" on a school computer), available at
2002 WL 3227075.
236. See Tom Murphy, Inmate Charged in Letter Mailing, SYRACUSE NEWSPAPERS
(N.Y.), Dec. 7, 2001, at C1 (covering the arrest of a Marcy Correctional Facility
inmate on charges of falsely reporting an incident), available at 2001 WL 5578431.
237. See Slade, supra note 36, at BI (explaining that Robert Niehoff, a seventy-six-
year-old city councilman, faced false reporting charges after telling the secretaries at
the local Borough Hall that he had gotten white powder on his clothes while
collecting the mail).
238. See Teresa Killian, Two Spartanburg, S.C., University Students Arrested for Terrorist
Joke, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS (Spartanburg, S.C.), Nov. 2, 2001 (recounting
how the students went to a local mall dressed in costume and threw a white substance
from a Johnson & Johnson bottle at mall stores while repeatedly saying "anthrax"),
available at 2001 WL 29844166.
239. See Kelly, supra note 32, at B01 (explaining that the boy claimed the formula
was anthrax so he would be declared a hero for discovering it and school would be
cancelled for the day).
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impending bombing "or other crime or catastrophe, 2 40 knowing that
the report is false and is likely to cause an evacuation or public
inconvenience or alarm.2 4 ' Activity of this nature that is intentionally
directed toward a government agency constitutes a separate
242offense. 2 Further, persons who implicate others by reporting to a
law enforcement officer the existence of a public hazard, crime,
offense, or incident that did not occur could be charged with the
misdemeanor of making "false reports" under laws based on
provisions of the Model Penal Code.242
States have prosecuted hoaxsters under disorderly conduct statutes
244as well 4. The Model Penal Code defines disorderly conduct as
engaging in "fighting or threatening," 245 or creating a "hazardous or
physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate
purpose of the actor,' ' 246 with the purpose of creating "public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating the risk
thereof., 247 The Code recommends that the offense be treated as a
petty misdemeanor.248
False reporting, false alarm, and disorderly conduct laws are often
invoked as supplemental charges for anthrax hoaxsters accused of
more serious offenses, such as terroristic threatening or threatening
the use of a weapon of mass destruction.249 Alternatively, these laws
could be used as fallbacks should the more serious allegations fail.25
240. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.3 (1985).
241. See id. (suggesting that this offense be categorized as a misdemeanor).
242. See id. § 241.4 (recommending that this offense also constitute a
misdemeanor).
243. Id. § 241.5.
244. See Mitch Martin, Woman Upset About a Bill Admits to Anthrax Mail Hoax, CHI.
TRiB., May 15, 2002, at B3 (reporting how a woman who mailed a hoax anthrax letter
to a mechanic because she was angry about her bill pleaded guilty to disorderly
conduct), available at 2002 WL 2655151; see also Todd Wright, Alleged Hoax Hits
Hospital in Beverly, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2002, at B2 (noting that the police were
preparing to charge a lab technician at a hospital with disorderly conduct for
reporting a false robbery and attack at the hospital).
245. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(1) (a) (1985).
246. Id.§250.2(1)(c).
247. Id.
248. See id. § 250.2(2) (explaining that the offense is a petty misdemeanor if the"actor's purpose is to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he
persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist").
249. See, e.g., Linda Deutsch, One Charged with Anthrax Hoax, AP ONLINE, Oct. 18,
2001, available at 2001 WL 29334942 (covering the story of a defendant charged with
threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction, criminal threats, misdemeanor
terrorism, and false reporting for creating an anthrax hoax). The defendant in the
case, Dionicio Garcia, wrote a false anthrax warning on a five-gallon bucket of rotten
beans and chili on the Queen Mary ship. See Anna Gorman, Los Angeles Man Held in
Anthrax Hoax Against Colleague Courts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at B3 (stating that
the bucket was discovered in a dumpster on the ship in Long Beach, California).
250. See, e.g., Man Enters Plea in Anthrax Scare, PREsS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.),
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The relatively light penalty scheme of these laws25' has come under
intense scrutiny in light of the recent anthrax scare, however,
prompting many state legislators to upgrade the penalties for offenses
in which hoax weapons of mass destruction are involved
2. Hoax crimes
Prior to September 11, only five states had enacted legislation that
was specifically designed to address hoax crimes.2 53 An example is
Florida's hoax crime law, which prohibits the unlawful manufacture,
possession, sale, delivery, display, use, threatened use, attempted use,
or conspiracy to use a "hoax weapon of mass destruction. '5 4 Several
other states, such as Colorado, 5 had hoax bomb statutes, but these
statutes did not cover anthrax-type hoaxes.2 6
Although these pre-September 11 hoax crime statutes have been
used to prosecute similar crimes, their specifics vary immensely,
particularly in terms of their mens rea requirements. 2 57 For example,
Florida mandates that the offender intend to deceive or mislead
another person into believing that the hoax weapon of mass
Jan. 25, 2002, at B06 (discussing Michael Millspaugh's nolo contendere plea to
reporting a false alarm charge for placing two shot glasses containing cleaning
powder in the purse of a co-worker); Katie E. Ismael, Woman Is Charged Over a Powdery
Substance, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Nov. 7, 2001, at B3 (reporting
Millspaugh's original charges of attempting a terrorist threat and attempting a threat
involving a weapon of mass destruction).
251. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 241.4, 250.2-.3 (1985) (classifying all three offenses
as misdemeanors).
252. See infra Part III.C (detailing changes in state hoax legislation, including
penalties, following September 11, 2001).
253. See generally Teresa P. Miranda, Drafting Hoax Anthrax Legislation, PROSECUTOR,
Jan./Feb. 2002, at 14 (summarizing existing state hoax laws and comparing the laws
to each other), available at WL 36-Feb Prosecutor 14. The five states are Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 790.166 (West 2002); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-85, (2002);
Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.075 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); Michigan, MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.200j (West 2002); and South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
23-730 (Law. Co-op. 2002). These statutes generally prohibit the manufacture,
possession, sale, delivery, transport, placement, display, use, threatened use,
attempted use, conspiracy to use, release for any unlawful purpose, dissemination,
act causing dissemination, concealment, or act making accessible any type of "hoax
device" or replica of a deadly device. See Miranda, supra, at 14 (noting that the
description of the object that is the subject of the hoax varies from state to state,
though the elements of the offense are generally very similar).
254. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166(3) (West 2002) (providing an exception for
those persons with lawful authority).
255. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-109 (West 2002).
256. See id. (indicating in the Historical and Statutory Notes that, through an
amendment that became effective on June 3, 2002, the terms "chemical, biological,
or radiological weapon or materials" were added to the statute, which previously
referred only to "explosives or incendiary devices").
257. See Miranda, supra note 253, at 14 (demonstrating the wide range of mens rea
requirements among the various states).
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destruction will cause terror, bodily harm, or property damage."'
This specific-intent requirement is similar to Florida's terroristic
threat statute. 259 At the other end of the spectrum, Michigan has no
intent requirement whatsoever; making terroristic threats appears to
260be a strict liability crime.
The punishments for these crimes also differ drastically. For
example, violation of South Carolina's hoax crime statute is a
misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of one year and a $10,000
fine, 261 whereas violation of Florida's statute is a second-degree felony
with a maximum penalty of fifteen years and a $10,000 fine.262
In their application, however, these states' hoax crime laws have
been used in the same type of prosecutions. Both Florida and
Michigan, for instance, have used their respective hoax crime laws
against juveniles. James Smith, Jr., a student at Flagler-Palm Coast
High School, was charged with violating Florida's hoax crime statute
when he poured headache medicine on a teacher's desk to get out of
school for the day.2 63 A middle-school student in the same area was
26arrested and almost charged with the same offense, 64 but was
eventually released when authorities determined that his
justification-he claimed to have accidentally spilled Kool-Aid
powder-was legitimate.
Like James Smith, Sean and Christopher Cook wanted to get a day
off from school, prompting them to spread a cup of flour from an
258. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166 (West 2002) (explaining in the Historical and
Statutory Notes that, in 2002, this mens rea requirement was removed entirely from
the statute, thereby creating strict liability).
259. See, e.g., Anthrax Hoax Suspect Posts $5,000 Bail, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale,
Fla.), Nov. 17, 2001, at 3B (charging defendant with violation of Florida's hoax crime
statute for threatening security guards at a local mall with a film canister containing
white powder); Police Report, Man Pleads Innocent in Mail Hoax, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 24, 2002, at 7 (charging defendant with violating Florida's hoax
crime statute for sending two letters containing baby powder to the County
Government Center and the sheriffs office).
260. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.200j (West 2002) (indicating that an
individual is in violation of the statute if he or she commits, for any "unlawful
purpose," an act involving a hoax substance).
261. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-730 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (proscribing the
manufacture, possession, transportation, distribution, use or aid, or counsel of,
solicitation of, or conspiracy with another of the use of a "hoax device").
262. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.166, 775.082-.083 (West 2002).
263. See Lelis, supra note 15, at C3 (reporting that the boy's mother claimed that
the hoax was a practical joke).
264. See Sandra Pedicini, Powder at School Is Only Kool-Aid, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct.
18, 2001, at DI (labeling the boy's actions as "an apparent attempt to trick people
into thinking [Kool-Aid] was anthrax"), available at 2001 WL 28417753.
265. See Lelis, supra note 15, at C3 (quoting the State Attorney's Office




envelope onto a hallway floor.266 The boys were caught on videotape
and pled guilty to violating Michigan's hoax crime statute, which
prohibits the "unlawful possession of an imitation harmful
substance. 2 67  They were sentenced to fifty hours of community
service at a health care facility and were ordered to watch the




One of the most popular means of addressing anthrax hoax crimes
is through state terroristic threat statutes. The Model Penal Code
defines this offense as a threat "to commit any crime of violence with
the purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building,
place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to
cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the
risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.
269
There are many benefits to using a terroristic threat statute. First,
the statute has both a private and public aspect: on the one hand, it
protects individuals from personal threats that place the victim in fear
of imminent harm;270 on the other hand, it punishes individuals who
271disrupt public events or facilities. Second, the form of the
terroristic threat does not matter;27 2 some states even recognize
threats of a non-verbal, symbolic nature.2 72  Nor does the offense
266. See Anthrax Hoax Brings Sentence, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), Jan. 10, 2002, at
A26 (noting that the boys were suspended for the remainder of the school year),
available at 2002 WL 4754705.
267. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.200j (West 2002).
268. See Anthrax Hoax Brings Sentence, supra note 266, at A26 (stating that this
offense normally carries a five-year sentence, but would not be imposed in this case
due to the age of the defendants). The court required the boys to pay $1,668 in
restitution. Id.
269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1985).
270. See id. at Pt. II, art. 211 (1985) (explaining that § 211.3 deals with situations in
which the offender threatens to commit a crime of violence with the intent to
terrorize another person or group of persons).
271. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1985).
272. See, e.g., People v. Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 786 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that a threat may be inferred from "all the surrounding circumstances" instead of
from "words alone," even where the terroristic threats statute explicitly requires
verbal or written statements); State v. Knight, 549 P.2d 1397, 1400 (Kan. 1976) ("The
general rule is that a threat otherwise coming within the purview of a statute need
not.., be in any particular form or in any particular words, and it may be made by
innuendo or suggestion, and need not be made directly to the intended victim.");
State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Minn. 1996) (holding that the Minnesota
terroristic threats statute places "no restriction" on the term "threatens" that would
limit the term to an oral statement).
273. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 629 P.2d 748, 751 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (determining
that the placement of a burning cross in the victim's yard constituted a "threat"
within the meaning of the terroristic threats statutes in the circumstances of the
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require an overt act in furtherance of the threat 274 or even the
possibility that the threat can be carried out.2 7 ' Moreover, the offense
is not dependent on the victim's state of mind, 27 6 but rather on a
reasonable person's objective response.277  Thus, a person could be
prosecuted successfully under a terroristic threat statute even where
the victim was not placed in actual terror2 78 or where the offender was
incapable of carrying out the threat.2 79  Third, state courts have
rejected challenges to terroristic threat statutes based on the First
Amendment.28' These courts reason that, by definition, a terroristic
threat constitutes threatening speech and therefore is not protected
by the First Amendment.28  Similarly, challenges on due process
grounds have met with near total failure.
Due to the statutes' apparent imperviousness to constitutional
challenges, several states have used their terroristic threat or
case); Murphy, 545 N.W.2d at 915-16 (affirming conviction of defendant under a
terroristic threat statute where defendant placed dead animal parts on the victim's
property because to restrict the term "threat" to verbal or written statements would
result in an "absurd[ity]").
274. See, e.g., Carver v. State, 369 S.E.2d 471, 472 (Ga. 1988) (holding that the
crime of terroristic threats is consummated when the threat is communicated to the
victim with the intent to terrorize).
275. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 453 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Del. 1982) (reasoning that an
offender need not intend to carry out a threat to violate the Delaware terroristic
threatening statute because the "threat itself creates certain identifiable injuries...
that the Criminal Code should protect against"); State v. Rodriguez, 569 N.W.2d 686,
695 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the defendant need not intend to execute his
threats to satisfy the requirements of the Nebraska terroristic threats statute).
276. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 569 N.W.2d at 695 (recognizing that the victim of a
terroristic threat need not be terrorized).
277. See, e.g., State v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing that the"reasonable person of ordinary intelligence" standard must be applied in light of the
circumstances of the case).
278. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 569 N.W.2d at 695 (demonstrating that a victim does not
need to be terrorized in order to find the defendant guilty of terroristic
threatening).
279. See, e.g., Allen, 453 A.2d at 1168 (holding that a defendant can commit
terroristic threatening without an intent to carry out the threat).
280. See, e.g., People v. Toledo, 26 P.3d 1051, 1060 (Cal. 2001) ("[1]t is clear that
defendant's conviction of attempted criminal threat was not based upon
constitutionally protected speech."); Lanthrip v. State, 218 S.E.2d 771, 773 (Ga.
1975) (reasoning that the type of speech involved in terroristic threats is not the type
of speech that would otherwise receive First Amendment protection);
Commonwealth v. Green, 429 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (stating that
the state's interest in the welfare of its citizens was sufficient to prohibit terroristic
threats).
281. Toledo, 26 P.3d at 1060; Lanthrip, 218 S.E.2d at 773; Green, 429 A.2d at 1182-
83.
282. See, e.g., Lanthrip, 218 S.E.2d at 773 (denying that the Georgia terroristic
threats statute is unconstitutionally vague because "the standard of guilt contained in
the statute is not left to speculation or conjecture, but rather, is fixed and certain as
to the conduct prohibited therein"); Milner, 571 N.W.2d at 14 (dismissing
defendant's First Amendment claims on the ground that the defendant's statements
were not protected by the First Amendment).
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terrorizing statutes to prosecute anthrax hoaxsters. For one example,
a man who had told workers in the downtown office of the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare that he had a box
containing anthrax was charged with making a terroristic threat, 3
even though he claimed to suffer from a mental illness.8 4 In another
instance, Andrew James Theodorakis, a senior at Dickinson College,
faced charges of both terroristic threatening and causing a
catastrophe for placing white powder in two envelopes sent through
intercampus mail bearing the message, "You now have anthrax.
Prepare to die.
2 ' 5
Louisiana prosecutors have been especially zealous in their
2886application of the state's terrorizing statute to hoax crimes, using
the law to prosecute a sixty-four-year-old preacher and two middle-
school student pranksters,8 7 among others. The preacher, Reverend
Charles Alexander, hand-delivered a letter containing salt to a social
service agency, forcing an evacuation of the building. He claimed
that the salt held religious significance for him and was meant as an
appeal to God.2 8 His arrest led to protests and demonstrations on his
behalf outside the Lafayette courtroom. 2 9  Eventually, Reverend
Alexander was released on bail on the condition that he refrain from
placing salt in any more envelopes.29'
283. See Man Faces Trial for Threats, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 28, 2001, at B2
(reporting that the box actually contained Christmas tree branches).
284. See id. (stating that the defendant intended to use mental illness as a defense
to the crimes charged).
285. See Elizabeth Gibson, Collegian Posts Bail in Anthrax Hoax, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov. 6, 2001, at A3 (reporting that Theodorakis was also
suspended indefinitely from college for perpetrating the hoax).
286. See, e.g., Stephanie Doster, Avondale Worker Held in Shipyard Anthrax Hoax,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 19, 2001, at I (describing the arrest of
Victor Falgout of Avondale on a charge of "terrorizing" after Falgout allegedly
sprinkled sugar in an Avondale shipyard's mailroom).
287. See Melissa Moore & Kevin Blanchard, 2 Glen Oaks Students Face Charges in
Powder Hoax, ADVOcATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 18, 2001, at 4A (reporting the
arrest of both students on terrorizing charges).
288. Jeanerette Pastor to Face Trial in Anthrax Hoax to State Agency, ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, La.), Dec. 9, 2001, at 4B [hereinafter Jeanerette Pastor] (quoting Assistant
District Attorney Greg Williams as saying that Alexander "'wreaked havoc'" with his
actions).
289. See Moore & Blanchard, supra note 287, at 4A (stating that the letter asked
the agency to investigate allegations that Reverend Alexander's grandchild was being
abused). But see Mandy Maxwell, Anthrax Scare Taxes Police, Health Officials,
ALEXANDRIA DAILY TOWN TALK (La.), Oct. 18, 2001, at 2 (claiming that Alexander was
upset with the social services department and had threatened the department in the
past), available at 2001 WL 33145698.
290. SeeJeanerette Pastor, supra note 288, at 4B (reporting that protesters bearing
signs and using megaphones gathered outside the courtroom in support of
Alexander).
291. See id. (stating that his bail was originally set at $150,000 but was reduced to
$50,000 on the condition that Alexander's attorney speak to him about "being
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As for the two middle-school students, they were taken to juvenile
hall after placing an envelope containing baby powder on a teacher's
desk. 29 Both the teacher and the school principal immediately
recognized the hoax as a prank but reported the incident to the
School Drug Task Force the following morning.29 That report
resulted in the arrest of the two thirteen-year-old boys.94  Finally,
three teens from Cobb County, Georgia were charged with making
terroristic threats for placing envelopes filled with flour on
neighbors' mailboxes on Halloween.29"
In addition to terroristic threatening laws, several states have
prosecuted anthrax hoaxsters296 under legislation prohibiting the use
or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction.97 The California
statute, for example, provides:
Any person who knowingly threatens to use a weapon of mass
destruction, with the specific intent that the statement... be taken
as a threat, which on its face is so unequivocal, immediate and
specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose
and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.., shall be
punished.
In Riverside, California, Randy Williams and Michael Vasquez, both
fourteen years old, faced harsh penalties for violating this statute.2
The boys decided to stage a Halloween prank by placing sugar in four
white envelopes marked "God Bless Afghanistan" and then placing
socially responsible").
292. See Moore & Blanchard, supra note 287, at 4A (relating that the students
placed the envelope on the teacher's desk while she was tutoring after school).
293. See id. (stating that the teacher recognized that the substance smelled like
baby powder).
294. See id. (stating that the two boys confessed to committing the hoax and
confirmed that the substance was baby powder).
295. See Cobb Teens Held in Mailbox Threats, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Nov. 10, 2001, at
H7 (stating that the sixteen-year-old and the two seventeen-year-olds were being held
on $25,000 bond each).
296. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 249, at B3 (listing those defendants charged
under California's state equivalent of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a for perpetrating anthrax
hoaxes).
297. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11418.5(a) (West 2002) (criminalizing the
threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2715(a)(4) (2002) (indicating that a violation is committed if an individual
"intentionally threatens by any means the placement or setting of a weapon of mass
destruction"); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-24 (2002) (prohibiting threats of terrorist acts).
298. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11418.5(a) (West 2002) (providing a punishment of
imprisonment in the county prison for a maximum of one year or in state prison for
three, four, or six years, and a maximum fine of $250,000).
299. See Rocky Salmon, 14-year-olds Face Charges in Prank, PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), Feb. 4, 2002, at BI (reporting that Creg Datig, overseer of the
district attorney's juvenile division, who attempted to explain the tough approach to
the boys' actions, stated that, "for the victim and in the eyes of law enforcement,
there is no difference between a prank and the real thing").
[Vol. 54:1
ANTHRAX HOAXES
the envelopes in friends' mailboxes. °° Unfortunately for the boys,
one envelope inadvertently ended up in the wrong mailbox, resulting
in a six-hour investigation of the envelope to determine its
contents.' Although the boys immediately stepped forward and
their parents offered to pay for all costs associated with the
decontamination effort, prosecutors arrested Williams and Vasquez
out of fear for public safety. 0 2 If convicted, the boys could have faced
an indeterminate amount of time in juvenile hall for the offense and
might also have been declared wards of the state, which would have
resulted in a separation of the boys from their parents:
C. State Hoax Crime Legislation Following September 11, 2001
The wave of real and hoax anthrax crimes that terrorized the
nation in the aftermath of September 11 prompted many states to
create or tighten laws punishing hoaxes involving a fake weapon of
304mass destruction. There is no clear and consistent reasoning
behind the approaches taken by these states, however. Some states
have simply amended their old laws to cope with new criminal realties
in the wake of September 11, some have created new laws out of old
cloth, and some states have employed both of these approaches. 5
States without hoax statutes after September 11 are in a very
precarious situation. These states are likely to punish perpetrators
under disorderly conduct or false alarm laws.300 Such a plan presents
300. See id. (stating that the boys went out on Halloween wearing signs around
their necks with "Anthrax" scrawled on them).
301. See id. (reporting that the neighbor receiving the anthrax was terrified while
she was waiting to learn whether the substance was real anthrax, but that she now
forgives the boys because they know what they did was wrong).
302. See id. (quoting the prosecuting attorney as saying: "What kind of message
would it send if we didn't take these cases seriously[?] ... We would be evacuating
places on a daily basis."). Prosecutors, however, decided against pursuing the matter
further. See Rocky Salmon, No Felony Charges in Anthrax Hoax, PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), Feb. 5, 2002, at BI.
303. See id. (claiming that the boys' parents have already paid a fine of $2,500 each
for emergency response costs, and that the boys have apologized to all of their
neighbors and the firefighters who responded to the hoax).
304. In addition to the variety of statutes that states have enacted individually, the
Emergency Health Powers Act, which is a model bioterrorism response law, has been
introduced in thirty-six states and adopted in part by eighteen states and the District
of Columbia. See Marcia Coyle, Bioterror law gains ground: Model statute wins favor in 19
states, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23, 2002, at Al (stating that the purpose of the Emergency
Health Powers Act is to strengthen state officials' emergency powers and modernize
public health laws).
305. See infra Part III.C (examining the combinations of new and amended hoax
crime statutes developed post-September 11, 2001).
306. See, e.g., Daniel C. Vock, Pols Work to Restore Laws Struck Down by High Court,
CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Nov. 27, 2001, at 1 (reporting that a prosecutor was charged with
disorderly conduct after committing an anthrax hoax against the Cook County
State's Attorney Office in October 2001); Beauge, supra note 34, at B12 (stating that
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a variety of problems. First, states might not be able to punish these
perpetrators appropriately in comparison to states that have statutes
designed specifically to combat anthrax hoax crimes. Second,
disorderly conduct or false alarm laws are often found to be vague
and overly broad, which could give police too much power in
arresting alleged hoaxsters and allow for over-punishment of
hoaxsters."7 Massachusetts faced this problem when an anthrax hoax
was perpetrated at the Agawam armory. °8  Agawam Police Chief
Robert Campbell explained that "our laws haven't had to deal with
things like anthrax hoaxes.... We had fire trucks and hazmat teams
at the armory, and white powder spread over the equipment, and no
way to charge anybody and no deterrent. 3 0 9 Prosecutorial problems
similar to the Agawam armory incident will continue as long as states
lack the ability to charge hoaxsters under narrowly tailored state law
instead of under federal law. °
Several states have enacted sweeping and comprehensive
legislation in an effort to combat anthrax hoax crimes. The
remainder of this section of the Article chronicles some of the states'
attempts to reconcile the disparities in prosecuting hoax crimes.
California's amended hoax crime statutes now accommodate the
circumstances surrounding recent anthrax hoaxes.31 ' The state's
amended weapons of mass destruction statute includes a hoax• • 312
provision, as well as an expanded definition of weapons of mass
313destruction. The statute also augmented the circumstances in
which the threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction is
considered a crime. 4
Steven Welch, a firefighter, was charged with making a false alarm to a public safety
agency for falsely telling federal officials that there was white powder in the envelope
containing his income tax refund).
307. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (striking down a loitering
statute as being void-for-vagueness).
308. Steve Marantz, Anti-Terrorism Bill Stuck at State House, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 1,
2002, at 1 (reporting that "[a]n anthrax hoax at the Agawam armory... was
prosecuted under a federal statute because the state law was inadequate").
309. Id. (stating that the hoax was prosecuted under a federal statute because the
state law did not fit the crime).
310. Since the Agawam incident, the Massachusetts Legislature passed an
amendment to the state criminal code, adding hoax substances to the hoax device
statute. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266, § 102A 1/2 (West 2004).
311. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11418.1 (West 2004) (creating a new component of§
11418 entitled "False or facsimile of weapon of mass destruction"). This section adds
a provision that changed the mens rea requirement. Id.
312. Id.
313. See id. § 11417 (expanding the meaning of weapon of mass destruction to
include chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological agents).
314. See id. § 11418.5 (allowing the occurrence of isolation, quarantine, or
decontamination to serve as proof that the victim was in "sustained fear" for his own
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California Penal Code § 11418.1 provides a penalty for any
individual who uses a hoax weapon of mass destruction with the
"intent to cause another person to fear for his or her safety, or for the
personal safety of others. 31 5 Violators of the hoax weapon of mass
destruction provision incur a maximum penalty of one year
imprisonment in county prison or "in the state prison for 16 months,
or two or three years and . . . a fine of not more than two hundred
and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)."3'6
California's "Threats to use weapon of mass destruction 31 7 law still
maintains an extremely specific standard of intent; the amendment
requires that the offender intend to make a threatening statement
"so unequivocal, immediate, and specific" as to lead the victim to
believe that execution of the threat is imminent.3 1 ' The amendment
also requires the offender to make the threat knowingly and with the
specific intent to cause another to fear for his or her own or
immediate family's safety.319 Offenders who violate this section face a
state prison sentence of three, four, or six years and a fine of not
more than $250,000.120
In contrast, the amendment to Florida Statutes Annotated §
321790.166 eliminated the intent requirement from its hoax crime.
The statute now incorporates biological agents as weapons of mass• 22
destruction and prohibits the acts of mailing and sending hoax
323weapons of mass destruction. However, the state's false reporting
324statutes continue to require the intent to deceive, mislead, or
or his family's safety, which is a requirement for prosecution of a hoaxster on a
weapons of mass destruction charge).
315. See id. § 11418.1 (requiring that the offender "gives, mails, sends, or causes to
be sent" to another individual or "places, causes to be placed, or possesses" a hoax
weapon of mass destruction).
316. Id.




321. See S.B. 998, 2002 Leg., 104th Reg. Sess. § 4(3) (Fla. 2002) (enacted)
(eliminating the requirement that the offender intend "to deceive or otherwise
mislead another person into believing the hoax weapon of mass destruction will
cause terror, bodily harm, or property damage").
322. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166(1) (c) (West 2004) (including "biological agent"
instead of "disease organism").
323. See id. § 790.166(3) (indicating that an individual is also in violation of the
provision if he or she "manufactures, possesses, sells, delivers, mails, sends, displays,
uses, threatens to use, attempts to use, or conspires to use, or who makes readily
accessible to others a hoax weapon of mass destruction").
324. Id. §§ 790.163-164.
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otherwise misinform the public about the placement of a weapon of
325mass destruction.
Pennsylvania's terroristic threat statute3 26 now includes a restitution
provision 3 2 7 and an expanded set of circumstances under which the
offense, normally a misdemeanor, is classified as a felony of the third
degree . 3 2 The state law that prohibits reports or threats of bombs has
been amended to include any such activity involving any weapon of
329mass destruction. Pennsylvania also codified a new facsimile
weapons of mass destruction statute that incorporates its former
facsimile bomb statute. Under this revised law, the intentional,
knowing, or reckless manufacture, sale, purchase, transport, delivery,
possession, or use of such a device is a third-degree felony if the
device harasses an individual or creates alarm or reaction on the part
331of a government agency. In addition to providing for
imprisonment, the statute also mandates that the perpetrator pay
restitution to the government.
33 2
Unlike either the California or Florida statutes, Pennsylvania makes
the creation or use of a hoax device a greater offense than a mere
threat of harm. 3 However, Pennsylvania's "Terroristic threats"3 4 and
"Threat to use weapons of mass destruction" 35 statutes are
constructed to provide equivalent penalties for threats regarding
weapons of mass destruction where those threats have the same
effects as the actual placement or use of a hoax device. 36 Because the
325. See id. § 790.163(3); § 790.164(3) (qualifying that a false report that is
knowingly made should be considered prima facie evidence of intent to deceive).
326. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2706 (West 2004).
327. See id. § 2706(b) (requiring any person convicted to pay restitution to the
government).
328. See id. § 2706(d) (including an upgraded penalty where "the threat causes the
occupants of the building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation to be
diverted from their normal or customary operations").
329. See id. § 2715(a) (3) (containing an amendment to the state's weapons of
mass destruction statute); see also H.B. 339, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2002)
(adding the generic term "weapons of mass destruction" to a list of items whose
unlawful use may not be taught to others; this bill passed in the House Committee on
Judiciary, but died in the Senate Committee on Judiciary).
330. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5516 (West 2004) (incorporating facsimile
bombs into the weapons of mass destruction statute).
331. Id. § 5516(a).
332. Id. § 5516(b)(b.1) (providing automatic restitution for all costs caused by the
offender's actions).
333. Compare id. § 2706(d), and id. § 2715(a) (denominating these offenses as
misdemeanors in most circumstances), with id. § 5516(a)-(b) (listing the offense a
felony).
334. Id. § 5516.
335. Id. § 2715.
336. See id. §§ 2706(d), 2715(b)(2) (making the offenses third-degree felonies
where the report or threat causes the occupants of a building, place of assembly, or
facility of public transportation to be diverted from their normal or customary
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amended statutes are primarily based on pre-existing state law,
Pennsylvania continues to differentiate between hoaxes that are
private in nature and those that impede basic public functions. This
separation attempts to resolve the conflict between public demands
to punish anthrax hoaxsters and the need to adhere to principles of
proportional punishment.
Two other states have moderately amended their extant laws.
Alaska redefined its terroristic threatening statute to include false
reports that disrupt the schedule of any entity providing
transportation services or the entity's attendant support services or
staff.337  Ohio laws §§ 2917.31338 and 2917.32339 impose additional
punishment on any person who induces panic resulting in physical
340injury or makes a false alarm involving weapons of mass
destruction.
Rather than amending its laws, Virginia responded to September
11 by enacting a new statute that prohibits the "[p]ossession,
manufacture, distribution, etc. of weapons of terrorism or hoax
device [s] .042 This statute has already been employed by
prosecutors. 43 The law provides separate punishments for actual and
hoax uses of weapons of terrorism. Like Virginia, North Carolina
added a hoax crime section to its body of criminal law. 45 This section
criminalizes the intentional perpetration of a hoax involving false
346weapons of mass destruction. North Carolina's criminal law also
includes a prohibition against false reports concerning weapons of
operations).
337. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.810 (Michie 2002) (providing that knowingly making
a false report is considered terrorist threatening in the second degree and is a class C
felony).
338. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2917.31 (West 2003).
339. Id. § 2917.32.
340. See id. § 2917.31 (increasing punishment from a first-degree misdemeanor to
a fourth-degree felony).
341. See id. § 2917.32 (providing heightened punishment for offenses involving
threatened weapons of mass destruction or resulting in severe economic harm).
342. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-46.6 (Michie 2004).
343. See Store Manager Accused in Sniper Hoax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at A15
(explaining that Virginia's new hoax law was used to charge a Burger King employee
who falsely reported-in the midst of the sniper attacks in the Washington, D.C.
area-the existence of a sniper on the roof of the restaurant in order to get the day
off from work).
344. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-46.6(A), (B) (Michie 2004) (classifying the use of
an actual weapon of terrorism as a class 2 felony, whereas the hoax use of such a
weapon is a class 3 felony).
345. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.24 (2003).
346. See id. § 14-288.24(a) ("Any person who, with intent to perpetrate a hoax,
conceals, places, or displays any device, object, machine, instrument, or artifact, so as
to cause any person reasonably to believe the same to be a nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapon of mass destruction is guilty of a Class D felony.").
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mass destruction.34' A false report occurs when a person knows or
should know that a report is false and communicates the report,
thereby causing a person reasonably to believe that there is a weapon
of mass destruction in a building or structure.
348
Indiana's legislature, like Virginia's, created a new criminal law
section in its weapons of mass destruction chapter. This section
added the new offense of "Terroristic mischief. 3 49  This Class C
felony 350 requires the intentional or knowing placement or
dissemination of a device or substance "with the intent to cause a
reasonable person to believe that the device or substance is a weapon
of mass destruction."3' In other words, this law would constitute a
typical hoax crime statute. However, if an act of terroristic mischief
results in a physician prescribing diagnostic testing or medical
treatment "for any person other than the person who committed,
352
the offense, or if a person suffers serious bodily injury, the
proposed crime becomes a Class B felony, which is a more serious
offense 54
Similarly, Illinois added a terroristic threat statute, 3'5 which requires
a knowing threat to commit a terrorist act that causes a reasonable
expectation of the imminent commission of the act.356 The threat
must also be made with the intent to intimidate or coerce "a
significant portion of the civilian population., 35' A violation would
3581constitute a Class X felony, punishable by up to thirty years in
prison.9  One unique feature of Illinois' legislation is its false
terroristic threat statute, 360 which criminalizes a threat to commit a
terrorist act, create a catastrophe, or create the impression that such
347. Id. § 14-288.23.
348. Id. § 14-288.23(a).
349. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-12-3 (Michie 2004).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. § 3547-12-3(1).
353. Id. § 3547-12-3(2).
354. Id. § 35-47-12-3.
355. 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/29D-20 (West 2003).
356. Id. 5/29D-20 (a).
357. Id.
358. Id. 5/29D-20(c).
359. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(3) (West 2003).
360. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29D-25 (supplementing the state's proposed"terroristic threats" statute); see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.810 (Michie 2002)
(containing a similar provision concerning false reports of terroristic threats).
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an act is about to be or has been committed.3 6 ' This Class 1 felony3 62
requires only that the offender knew that the threat was false.363
While the terroristic threat and false terroristic threat statutes
might sound redundant, combined they are more effective than a
terroristic threat statute alone, because together they can combat the
evolving nature of hoax crimes. For example, unlike Florida's hoax
crime legislation,64 Illinois' legislation differentiates malicious hoax
crimes from those made in jest and provides penalties reflecting this
365difference. Because the provisions are rooted in the language of
threats, Illinois' legislation avoids possible vagueness concerns while
maintaining effective mechanisms for punishing pranksters who
perpetrate hoaxes involving weapons of mass destruction.
The use of the term "threat" carries its own perils, however. It is
unclear exactly how either of the Illinois statutes applies to a situation
in which a hoaxster claims to be the victim of a weapon of mass
destruction. For example, an office worker who pours sugar on his
desk and calls it anthrax,366 or a firefighter who calls the police and
claims he has been exposed to anthrax,6 does not clearly seem to
have threatened to commit or cause the commission of a terrorist act.
While he or she may be the perpetrator of the hoax, the prankster in
this situation does not claim to perpetrate an actual act of terrorism.
Ultimately, the dependency of Illinois' legislation on actual or false
threats to commit terrorist acts could render either legislation
ineffective where a grossly inappropriate, yet non-threatening, hoax is
perpetrated.
A better alternative to Illinois' actual and false terroristic threat
provisions is South Dakota's new and amended legislation,
361. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29D-25 (West 2003). "Terrorist act" is defined at
5/29D-10(1)(1). Id. "Catastrophy" is defined at 20.5-5. Id.
362. Id. 5/29D-25(b).
363. Id. 5/29D-25(a).
364. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166(3) (West 2002) (eliminating any requirement of
intent by the perpetrator of a hoax crime).
365. Compare 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/29D-20(c) (West 2003) (making an actual
terroristic threat a Class X felony with a punishment of up to thirty years), with id.
5/29D-25(b) (making a false terrorist threat a Class I felony with a punishment of up
to fifteen years).
366. See, e.g., Tucker supra note 33, at B4 (describing the arrest and trial of a U.S.
Capitol Police officer who sprinkled granules of artificial sweetener on a guard
station desk).
367. See, e.g., Beauge, supra note 34, at B12 (covering the story of Steven Welch, a
Pennsylvania firefighter who falsely claimed to be the victim of an anthrax attack).
Welch told federal officials that there was white powder in the envelope containing
his income tax refund when in fact there was no such powder. Id. He was charged
with criminal mischief, making a false alarm to a public safety agency, making false
reports to law enforcement agencies, and tampering with evidence. Id.
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encompassing false reporting,368 terroristic threats, 69 and hoax
370crimes. South Dakota promulgated proscribing a terroristic threat,
which is punished as a Class 4 felony, making it the most serious of
these three offenses. 37 The criminal hoax statute punishes any
person who intentionally places, possesses, uses, or transports a hoax
substance or device with the intent of causing anxiety, unrest, fear, or
personal discomfort.372 Such a statute preserves the stricter intent
requirements of the Illinois criminal code provisions, while
broadening the potential application of the law to any hoax situation.
By focusing on the motive for the hoax rather than on the form,
South Dakota's law provides an effective alternative to the under-
inclusive Illinois provision.
While South Dakota's false reporting law requires the intent to
deceive, mislead, or misinform another, North Carolina has no intent
requirement for false reporting.373 In contrast, both states require
intent for a violation of their hoax crime statutes. 374 Although North
Carolina requires intent for a hoax and not for a false report,
conviction for either offense results in the same level of
punishment.375  This anomaly allows for the possibility that an
intentional crime may be punished identically to a strict liability
crime. South Dakota avoids this inconsistency by requiring intent for
both offenses and differentiating between punishments.
3 76
368. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-14A-22 (Michie 2003) (including a 2002 amendment
that added "dangerous chemical, biological agent, [and] poison" to the list of
destructive devices covered by statute and substituting "reporting a threat" for"reporting a bomb").
369. Id. § 22-14A-24 ("Use of substance or device to communicate terroristic
threat").
370. Id. § 22-14A-25 ("Use of hoax substance or device to cause fear").
371. Id. § 22-14A-24 (criminalizing a threat that causes "serious public
inconvenience, or the evacuation or serious disruption" in a variety of listed public
places).
372. See id. § 22-14A-25 (defining a hoax substance as "any substance that would
cause a person to reasonably believe that it is a dangerous chemical or biological
agent, a poison, a harmful radioactive substance, or a similar substance").
373. Compare id. § 22-14A-22 (punishing those who posess intent to mislead any
person), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.23 (2003) (requiring mere knowledge on the
part of the person making the report).
374. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.24 (2003) (requiring the "intent to perpetrate a
hoax"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 22-14A-25 (Michie 2003) (requiring the "intent of
causing anxiety, unrest, fear, or personal discomfort").
375. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.24 (2003) (classifying a hoax offense as a Class D
felony); see also id. § 14-288.23 (classifying a false report as a Class D felony).
376. Compare S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-14A-25 (Michie 2003) (classifying a hoax




Analogous to South Dakota, NewJersey's terroristic threat statute377
states that threatening "to commit any crime of violence with the
purpose to terrorize another or cause the evacuation 3 78 of a public
facility or otherwise inconvenience the public in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such terror is a third-degree felony, 79 New Jersey
also amended its false public alarms statute by increasing the
penalties for violating the law"8° and created additional penalties for
311false public alarms involving the use of a facsimile bomb.
While most states have been successful in passing meaningful hoax
crime legislation, some states have not been able enact such laws.
States' failed legislation, however, can provide practical suggestions to
prosecute a variety of terrorist hoaxes. Kansas Senate Bill 594382 and
Kansas House Bill 2986383 proposed a comprehensive, straightforward
response to recent anthrax hoaxes. The bills included sections on
3814false reporting, perpetrating a hoax with a weapon of mass
destruction, 385 and terroristic threats.
86
The Kansas false reporting provision would criminalize any false
report that causes another person to reasonably believe that a
weapon of mass destruction is located in a nearby building, provided
3871the offender knows or should have known that the report is false.
The proposed hoax weapon statute would criminalize the intentional
concealment, placement, or display of "any device, object, machine,
instrument or artifact" that causes a reasonable person to believe the
device is a weapon of mass destruction. The false reporting and
377. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-3 (West 2003).
378. Id.
379. See id. (violating this statute during a declared national, state, or county
emergency is a second-degree felony).
380. See id. § 2C:33-3(c) (upgrading the offense to a first-degree felony if the alarm
results in death or serious bodily injury to another).
381. See id. § 2C:33-3(b) (providing that it would also be a "crime of the second
degree if in addition to the report or warning initiated, circulated or transmitted"
the offender placed or caused to be placed any "false or facsimile bomb in a
building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport or in a place likely to cause
public inconvenience or alarm"). The statute does not address penalties for the use
of facsimile biological weapons.
382. S.B. 594, 79th Leg., 2002 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002).
383. H.B. 2986, 79th Leg., 2002 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002).
384. See Kan. S.B. 594, § 7 (proposing a new offense labeled "false report involving
a weapon of mass destruction").
385. See Kan. H.B. 2986, § 6(a) (proposing a new offense labeled "perpetration of
a hoax by a weapon of mass destruction").
386. See Kan. S.B. 594, § 2 (defining terroristic threat as any "threat to commit the
crime of terrorism causing reasonable expectation or fear of imminent commission
of such offense").
387. See id. § 7(a) (defining a false report as communication "by any means" that is
knowingly false).
388. Kan. H.B. 2986, § 6(a) (requiring that the weapon of mass destruction be
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hoax weapons bills avoid overbreadth by including a mens rea
requirement. 9  The terroristic threats provision would punish any
threat to commit terrorism that causes a "reasonable expectation or
fear of imminent commission of that offense., 390 Further, a violation
of the hoax crime provision would constitute a level 3 felony
offense,39 while false reports and terroristic threats would constitute
level 4 offenses. 9
Like Kansas, Alabama was also unable to pass new hoax crime
legislation.393 Alabama proposed a comprehensive legislative plan for
addressing hoax crimes.9  This legislation differentiated between a
hoax crime intended to harm the victims 395 and one intended to fool
the victims.3 96  This difference in intent was reflected in the
classification of the offenses: the more egregious the intent, the
harsher the sentence. However, the false reporting provision
39 7
•398
which had no scienter requirement 9 but provided for the same
punishment as a hoax crime , nullifies the utility of a hoax crime
provision. That is, the amended false reporting statute, which has no
intent requirement, provides the same penalty as the proposed hoax
crime legislation, which does have an intent requirement. It is
unclear why a prosecutor would ever use the law contemplated in the
proposed hoax crime legislation when he or she could reach the
same result under the false reporting statute, whose elements are
easier to meet.
nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical in nature).
389. For an example of overly broad state legislation due to a lack of a mens rea
requirement, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166 (2),(3) (West 2002).
390. Kan. S.B. 594, § 2(a).
391. Kan. H.B. 2986, § 6(c).
392. Kan. S.B. 594, § 7(c) (classifying a false report as "level 4, nonperson felony").
If death or injury occurs due to the threat, it shall be punished as a Level 2 offense.
Id. § 2(b) (2).
393. See Status of S.B. 265, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002), available at
http://alisdb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/SESSBillsStatusResults.asp?BillNumber=265
(not-ing that the Alabama Senate Bill was "Indefinitely Postponed in House of
Origin").
394. S.B. 265, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002) (repealing state laws governing
possession and use of explosive devices and false explosive devices).
395. See id. § 7(c) (specifying that a hoaxster who interferes with "the ability of
another person to carry on the ordinary course of business, trade, education, or
government" will be guilty of a Class C felony).
396. See id. § 7(a)-(b) (criminalizing the manufacture, possession, transport, or
distribution of "a hoax device or replica of a destructive device, detonator or
bacteriological or biological weapon" as a Class A misdemeanor).
397. Id. § 22(b) (expanding the false reporting provision to include "hazardous or
dangerous substance [s] ").
398. See id. § 22(a) (requiring only that the offender know that the report is false).
399. Compare Ala. S.B. 265 § 22(b), with id. § 7(d) (classifying both of these
offenses as Class C felonies).
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III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT ANTHRAX HOAX LAWS AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATION
A. Definitional and Textual Problems
One of the most fundamental problems with current anthrax hoax
laws is that many states' definitions of biological weapons of mass
destruction do not include hoax biological agents. New Jersey's
biological agents statute illustrates this basic substantive
predicament.40° Although New Jersey's new statute makes it illegal to
threaten to use a biological agent, including anthrax, the only part of
the statute relevant to hoaxes is a provision that proscribes the
placement of a false or facsimile bomb40 1 in combination with causing
402a false public alarm.
Another fatal flaw in states' hoax crime laws is that, while they
could easily incorporate hoax biological agents, they appear to refer
only to detonators or destructive devices. This flaw can be rectified if
state legislation amends or creates new statutes to include hoax
substances. Massachusetts' original hoax devices statute, for example,
included "any device for endangering life or doing unusual damage
to property, or both, by fire or explosion, whether or not contrived to
ignite or explode automatically., 40 3 Although fake anthrax mimics a
biological agent that threatens human life, this statute would not
readily apply to anthrax hoax crimes because anthrax does not cause
damage by fire or explosion. To correct this deficiency,
Massachusetts amended its hoax device statute to include hoax
substances.4 °4
Further, textual problems plague state hoax crime laws that use the
term "threat." The dictionary definition of "threat '40 5 leaves unclear
whether making a threat includes situations such as sending talcum
powder in the mail with the intent that the recipient believes that it
contains a harmful biological agent. The problem lies in the fact
that, in this scenario, the perpetrator causes harm rather than merely
having the intent to cause harm. Defense attorneys could make a
convincing argument that sending talcum powder does not constitute
a threat. Therefore, states need to include precise language in their
400. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:38-3 (West 2003).
401. Id. § 2C:33-3(b).
402. Id. § 2C:33-3(a).
403. MAss. ANN. LAws. ch. 266, § 102A (Law. Co-op. 1970).
404. See id. § 102A 1/2(b) (2003) (defining a hoax substance as a "harmful
chemical or biological agent, a poison, [or] a harmful radioactive substance").
405. According to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2382 (1993), a threat is
defined as "[a] n expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage."
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statutes to avoid arguments over how to interpret the nature of a
threat. Specific language will close textual loopholes and will result
in the successful prosecution of relevant offenders.
To overcome the difficulties of articulating what constitutes a
criminal hoax, legislatures could write statutes that only vaguely
define anthrax hoaxes. °6 The most pressing concern, in terms of
both fairness and necessary vagueness, is to ensure that citizens are
given adequate notice of what the government is regulating and what
standards will be used to determine if a criminal hoax has been
committed.4 7 Precise definitions of the criminalized actions and the
controlling mental state will allow state legislatures to defeat future
challenges on void-for-vagueness grounds.
B. Acti Rei
As discussed above, comprehensive hoax crime statutes should
include three separate acti rei: filing a false report, making a
terroristic threat, and committing a hoax. Without all three acti rei, a
state is not sufficiently equipped to prosecute the various types of
crimes committed involving fake anthrax. Although some states
categorize terroristic threats, false reports, and hoaxes as constituting
one crime, this approach is not appropriate because it allows for
disproportional punishments and stretches the crime too far by
attempting to apply it to three very different acts. In Kentucky, for
example, an individual is guilty of terroristic threatening if he or she
makes a false report or commits a hoax crime.408 These acti rei must
be separated into distinct crimes in order to tailor punishments to fit
the particular crime and to articulate clearly the acts that are
necessary for commission of each crime. The following sections
detail how states have dealt with the three acti rei separately and the
problems they encountered in doing so. Their experiences will prove
helpful in designing more effective legislation.
406. See Lanthrip v. State, 218 S.E.2d 771, 773 (Ga. 1975) (denying that the
Georgia terroristic threats statute is unconstitutionally vague, because "[t]he
standard of guilt contained in the statute is not left to speculation or conjecture, but
rather, is fixed and certain as to the conduct prohibited therein").
407. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1999) (explaining that
vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons: first,
it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to
understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (same).




State legislators have particularly focused on creating terroristic
threat statutes; consequently, most states already have relevant
terroristic threat legislation on their books.409 These statutes are
vulnerable to due process challenges, however.4 °  Specifically,
legislators writing terroristic threat statutes must consider the due
process challenges that their statutory provisions could face based on
the vagueness of the term "threat." A failure to do so has already
resulted in state court findings of unconstitutionality.
In the successful due process challenge presented in State v.
411Hamilton, for example, the Nebraska Supreme Court found its
"terroristic threats" statute41 2 unconstitutional because it provided
that a person was guilty of making terroristic threats if he or she
threatened to commit any crime likely to result in death or serious
413physical injury or substantial property damage to another person.
The court noted that it was uncertain from the language of the
statute precisely what constituted a threat or crime likely to result in
injury or damage.1 4 The court noted further that the statute had no
provision for distinguishing between threats made in jest and threats
made in seriousness.
In accordance with Hamilton, the Nebraska Legislature replaced its
"terroristic threats" statute in 1986 with legislation similar to that
recommended in the Model Penal Code. 16 The new statute made it
illegal to threaten to commit a crime of violence with the specific
intent to terrorize another as the result of the threat.4 17  In a
challenge to this provision in State v. Schmailzl,48 the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutionally vague.4 9 The
court recognized that the term "threat" was no more defined in the
409. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-3 (West 2003); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-
311.01 (Michie 2002).
410. See supra Part III.A.
411. 340 N.W.2d 397 (Neb. 1983).
412. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-311 (repealed Michie 1986).
413. Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d at 399.
414. See id. (holding that the terms failed the Nebraska Supreme Court's own
standard for vagueness announced in State v. Adkins, 241 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Neb.
1976)).
415. See id. at 399 (questioning to whom the threat would have to be made in
order to be taken seriously).
416. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-311.01 (Michie 2002).
417. Id.
418. 502 N.W.2d 463 (Neb. 1993).
419. See id. at 466-67 (looking to the dictionary definition of "threat" as evidence
of the common understanding of that term which gave fair notice as to what
"threats" would be punished under the statute).
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new statute than in the old one ,420 but looked to precedent from
other states to support the proposition that the term "threat" was
sufficiently understandable to a reasonable person to satisfy due
process requirements.4 21 Thus, while the language of a terroristic
threats statute conceivably could be impermissibly vague in certain
circumstances, some courts have rejected this argument in practice.
As long as the statute requires that the offender have the specific
intent of terrorizing another or placing another in fear of harm or
damage, the statute is likely to be upheld.
2. False reports
While most states have terroristic threat statutes, false report
statutes are not as common. Although states could attempt to
prosecute perpetrators of false reports under hoax statutes, there are
important differences between the elements of these two crimes.
These differences were highlighted by a false report of anthrax in
Connecticut in early 2002. Joseph Faryniarz, a Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) worker, reported to
DEP security the presence of anthrax on his computer, even though
he knew the anthrax was fake and had been placed there as a hoax by
a co-worker. 2 Faryniarz's false report caused the closure of part of
downtown Hartford and resulted in a loss of one million dollars in
worker productivity. 42 Authorities did not prosecute Faryniarz for the
hoax, however, because he did not perpetrate it; he merely falsely
reported it. 424 According to news reports, there was not enough
evidence to support the charge against Faryniarz for making either a
terroristic threat or a false report.
425
Another interesting situation occurred two days after the first
anniversary of September 11, when, at a restaurant in Georgia, a
woman overheard three men of Middle Eastern descent discussing
what she interpreted to be plans for a terrorist attack.426 Believing
420. Id. at 466.
421. See id. (citing Lanthrip v. Georgia, 218 S.E.2d 771, 773 (Ga. 1975), for its
persuasive value and the proposition that a similar Georgia statute could be
understood by a reasonable person seeking to comply with the law).
422. See Edmund H. Mahony, Anthrax Hoax Case Falters, HARTFORD CouRANT
(Conn.), June 5, 2002, at BI (relating the events leading up to Joseph Faryniarz's




425. See id. (stating that Faryniarz's lawyer argued that Faryniarz was the victim of
this hoax rather than the perpetrator who should be prosecuted for it).
426. See David M. Halbfinger, Terror Scare in Florida: False Alarm, But Televised, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at A1O (reporting that, while eating at a Shoney's restaurant,
[Vol. 54:1
ANTHRAX HOAXES
that the men were planning to "blow something up, 427 she alerted
the Georgia State Patrol, which triggered a massive interstate
response involving more than one hundred officers from more than
twenty agencies as well as numerous media personnel.428 When the
police found no explosives in the men's car, they handled the
situation as a hoax rather than as a serious terrorist attack plan. 9
This incident demonstrates that a perpetrator's activity can have
characteristics of both a hoax and a false report, highlighting the
need for both laws in order to ensure that individuals like these three
men cannot escape punishment for wasting emergency response time
and money. Failing to enact false reporting legislation allows
individuals like Faryniarz and the three false Georgia plotters to
escape punishment proportional to their crime, even though
commission of the crime resulted in emergency costs and terrorized
others.
3. Hoax crimes
Similar to the absence of false reporting statutes, many states do
not have a useful hoax crime or hoax with a biological agent statute
on their books. Even though the enormous wave of anthrax hoaxes
following September 11 has subsided somewhat, the need for
carefully crafted hoax legislation continues to be a significant
concern because the threat of bioterrorism still looms large on the
4301horizon. Since hoaxes involving biological weapons of mass
destruction became a legislative focus only in the aftermath of
September 11, many technical issues still require resolution.
A major problem presented by anthrax hoax crimes is that the
substances used to commit these crimes-such as talcum powder,
aspartame, Kool-Aid, or flour-are not illegal to distribute,
Eunice Stone heard the men in the booth next to her laughing about the events of
September 11, 2001 and saying, "If they mourn Sept. 11, what will they think about
Sept. 13?" The men then went on to say, "Do you think that will bring it down," to
which another replied, "Well, if that doesn't bring it down, I have contacts to bring it
down.").
427. Id.
428. See id. (stating that the investigation lasted for more than seventeen hours,
during which Interstate 75 was sealed off and the men's car was searched for
explosives).
429. See id. (reporting that, although the men had not been charged with
anything, the situation would be pursued as a possible hoax).
430. See Bersia, supra note 23, at All (writing that the tensions between the United
States and Iraq have fueled fears of possible bioterrorism, which could include
anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, cholera, plague, and smallpox); see also David
Johnston & Carl Hulse, Finding of Deadly Poison in Office Disrupts the Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2004, at Al; Carol Morello & Spencer S. Hsu, Ricin Partially Shuts Senate,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 2004, at Al.
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manufacture, purchase, or possess. Thus, if the hoax statute
criminalizes the act of making fake anthrax readily accessible to
others, the states should require that the provider had the intent or
knowledge that the substance would be used as fake anthrax.
Otherwise, people who have nothing to do with the crime could be
found guilty.
Another difficulty facing legislatures constructing hoax statutes is
the determination of whether the anthrax hoaxster must intend to
scare or terrorize the general public, a specific number of people, or
an individual person. States must be careful not to create a statute
that could apply only to a particular number of people since this
would exclude hoaxes in which the perpetrator targets a private
individual. For this reason, using the term "another" or the words
"any individual" to refer to the victim of an anthrax hoax provides
statutory protection for all victims-from one person to the public at
large.
A third issue requiring resolution is to determine the importance
of the location of the hoax perpetration. State hoax bills have dealt
with the issue of location in a variety of ways, from not mentioning it
at all 43 1 to detailing every possible place in which an anthrax hoax
might be carried out.432 The specificity of locations could hinder the
successful prosecution of an anthrax hoaxster if the hoax is
perpetrated in a way that no one anticipated-much the same way
that no one anticipated the attack plan used by the September 11
hijackers.
Unlike Washington House Bill 2759, which lists numerous
locations in one statute, some states have created separate hoax
provisions for each different location. North Carolina, for example,
has created a separate hoax bill for schools. 4 33 While the perpetrator
would be prosecuted under the hoax crime statute,434 a student
committing a hoax on school grounds would face an additional
431. E.g., H.B. 7439, 2001-2002 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2002).
432. E.g., H.B. 2759, 57th Leg., 2d Sess., § 3 (Wash. 2001):
Any person who maliciously places a chemical, biological, explosive,
incendiary, flammable, or radiological substance or device in, upon, under,
against, or near any building, vehicle, roadway, bridge, ferry, vessel, canal,
train, railroad track, airplane, public or private electric, water, sewer, gas,
telecommunications, or other utility production or transmission facility,
structure or equipment, computer system or network, or any other structure,
utility, common carrier, or mode of transportation, in such a manner or
under such circumstances as to destroy, contaminate, damage, or injure it if
diffused, ignited, or exploded is guilty of [the crime of malicious
placement].
433. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115c-391 (4) (d) (3) (2003).
434. Id. § 14-288.24.
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punishment of expulsion from school for one year. 35 Even though
the statutes are distinguished by location, however, the penalty is
often the same for each. States following this pattern should decide
why the specific location is significant and whether separate
provisions for each location are really necessary. Otherwise, these
states seem to be making legislation without fully considering the
desired objective, such as punishing a hoaxster who targets an
elementary school more severely than one who targets an individual's
home.
C. Problems with States' Current Mens Rea Requirements
Another critical question that legislators must consider when
drafting criminal hoax statutes is what mental state a perpetrator
should have in order to be held liable for a criminal hoax.4 6 Drafters
have variously chosen to adopt a specific intent standard that focuses
on the mind of the perpetrator,' 7 a reasonableness standard focusing




Many state hoax statutes that contain a specific intent mens rea
requirement that focuses solely on the perpetrator's intent to
terrorize, deceive, frighten, scare, or otherwise intimidate, excludehoaxe mad " " 440
hoaxes made in jest. 4 Consequently, states wishing to enact statutes
capable of punishing hoaxsters, regardless of the perpetrator's mens
rea, must draft provisions that encompass both situations.
Determining the mens rea requirement based solely on whether the
victim believed the anthrax is real is insufficient, because this does
not separate a hoax done in jest from one done with malice. Without
435. Id. § 115c-391(4)(d)(3).
436. See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law
and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 341, 341 (2001). Professor Batey
argues that American jurisdictions take two basic approaches to the mens rea
element of a crime: while a majority of the states and the federal system allow courts
to construe crimes as requiring specific intent, general intent, strict liability, or one
of the seemingly infinite shades of meaning along the continuum on which these
three concepts reside, a substantial minority use the structure reflected in § 2.02 of
the Model Penal Code, which deploys five discrete levels of culpability-purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and strict liability-according to relatively strict
rules ofjudicial construction. Id.
437. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 35(b) (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166 (West 2002).
438. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11418.1, 11418.5 (West 2003) (focusing on the
perception of the victim to determine whether a threat is immediate and specifically
targeted against the individual who receives it).
439. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 750.200j (Michie 2001).
440. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 35(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166.
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legislative attention to this important issue, a hoaxster could argue
that he or she honestly believed that the victim would know that the
substance was not anthrax, regardless of whether the actor
committed the act with malice or terroristic intent.
The drawback of a specific intent requirement"' is that hoaxes
made in jest may not meet this stringent threshold. For example, the
prankster who places white powder on a classroom table hoping that
someone mistakes it for anthrax would fail to meet the specific intent
requirement if he or she intended it only as a joke rather than to
scare by knowingly placing the substance."' Concern about
overzealous prosecution of childish pranks is a good reason to adopt
a specific intent requirement in any model hoax crime legislation."3
441. Another potential criticism of a hoax crime bill that retains a specific intent
requirement could be the same criticism that has plagued stalking statutes in recent
years. See, e.g., Carol E. Jordan et al., Stalking: Cultural, Clinical and Legal
Considerations, 38 BRANDEIs L.J. 513, 550-52 (2000) (discussing the relationship
between stalking and assault and the difficulty with finding a mens rea that fits
proposed stalking legislation). Academics have commented that an ongoing
problem with stalking legislation and stalking laws already on the books is that they
require that the perpetrator have the specific intent to injure or instill fear in the
victim. SeeJoseph C. Merschman, Note, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the
Need for Contemporay Legislation, 24 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 255, 269-71 (2001). Their
position is that the major problem with requiring that the perpetrator have the
specific intent to threaten the victim is that the government is left with deciding
between prosecuting a lesser included offense, such as harassment, or taking on the
added burden of proving intent. Id. In response, some academics have advocated
for a less stringent reasonableness standard for stalking statutes. They would require,
for example, that the person knew or reasonably should have known that his or her
conduct would cause an individual to reasonably fear for his or her safety. See, e.g.,
Jordan et. al., supra, at 576-77. The theory is that both having a specific intent
requirement and having a reasonable apprehension of a weapon (or stalker) provide
sufficient notice to the defendant that his or her conduct is illegal, but only the
reasonableness standard is practical enough to make many prosecutions feasible. Id.
Some states have responded to such criticism by attempting to sidestep specific
intent and completely eliminating any mens rea requirement. See, e.g., MICH. STAT.
ANN. 750.200j (Michie 2001); S.B. 998, 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2002) (enacted)
(eliminating intent for the hoax). But see Katherine R. Tromble, Note, Humpty
Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed Methodology for Interpretation, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 521, 526-27 (1999) (arguing that the first principle the Supreme Court
established regarding mens rea in federal criminal statutes was a presumption in
favor of mens rea standards generally).
442. While Florida has adopted "intent to deceive" as the requisite mens rea for
the crimes involving false reporting, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.163, 790.164 (West
2002), the state has opted for strict liability for hoax crimes, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
790.166(3) (West 2002); see also infra notes 447-449 and accompanying text
(addressing strict liability). In 2000, the Florida Legislature enacted a law that
included intent to deceive as the mens rea for hoax crimes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
790.166(3) (West 2000) ("intent to deceive or otherwise mislead another into
believing that the hoax weapon of mass destruction will cause terror, bodily harm, or
property damage"). In 2002, the Legislature adopted a bill eliminating the intent-to-
deceive requirement. See S.B. 998, 2002 Reg. Sess., § 4 (Fla. 2002) (codified at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 790.166(3) (West 2002)).
443. See Kelly, supra note 32, at B.01 and accompanying text; see also Salmon, supra
note 299, at BI (stating that the two boys could become wards of the state for
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2. The reasonableness standard and the victim's mens rea
A reasonableness standard requires the perpetrator to "cause
another to reasonably believe" that he or she has been exposed to a
weapon of mass destruction. However, adoption of this standard
does not take into account the perpetrator's malevolence. Because
the perpetrator's actus reus and mens rea are the same whether a
reasonable or unreasonable person experiences fear, statutes should
focus on the hoaxster's mens rea when determining the severity of
the punishment.
For the same reasons, a mens rea requirement that focuses on the
victim's mindset should also be rejected. Such a requirement allows
for too much unpredictability in prosecuting hoaxsters because it
emphasizes the individual's subjective response to the hoax.445 A
better approach would be to presume that the victim will be scared or
terrorized and to examine whether this was the perpetrator's intent.
Another reason to reject the reasonableness standard and not
focus on the victim's mindset is that this standard frees from liability
the joking hoaxster who tells his or her victim ahead of time that he
or she will be receiving fake anthrax. These hoaxsters still risk
causing an emergency response and terrorizing victims or
unintended targets; therefore, they should at the least be ordered to
pay a substantial fine.446
3. Strict liability
States must strike a balance between statutes with specific intent
mens rea requirements that under-punish and strict liability statutes
that over-punish. When states' hoax statutes have no mens rea
requirement, perpetrators will be over-punished because strict
liability standards do not differentiate between hoaxes that are done
in jest and those done with malice. Thus, strict liability hoax crimes
in most states carry penalties that are not proportional to hoaxes
made in jest. This is a real concern because both Florida447 and
committing an anthrax hoax that they intended as a Halloween prank).
444. E.g., S.B. 265, 2002 Reg. Sess., § 7(a) (Ala. 2002).
445. See Mike Hoyem, Jury Acquits Man in Anthrax Hoax, NEwS-PRESS (Fort Meyers,
Fla.), Aug. 21, 2002, at IA (reporting the story of a Florida man who was acquitted on
a charge of using a hoax weapon of mass destruction after sprinkling white powder
on his best friend's mail, because the neighbor testified that the powder did not
scare him).
446. See, e.g., Halbfinger, supra note 426, at A10 (discussing how the report led to
the authorities sealing off an interstate highway and triggering an immense law
enforcement response).
447. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166(3) (West 2002) ("Any person who, without
lawful authority, manufactures, possesses, sells, delivers, mails, sends, displays, uses,
threatens to use, attempts to use, or conspires to use, or who makes readily accessible
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Colorado enacted strict liability hoax biological weapon statutes in
the spring of 2002 that categorize the crime as a felony.49 Strict
liability should be used only if the punishment for hoaxes done in jest
is reduced to payment of restitution, a fine, or both.
4. Due process problems with mens rea requirements: unduly vague or overly
broad mens rea
Vague and broad mens rea requirements negate the purpose of
creating a hoax statute because they are no more tailored to hoaxes
than are the states' disorderly conduct statutes. The various mens rea
standards include the intent to alarm or harass, to cause
inconvenience, annoyance, alarm, unrest, personal discomfort, panic,
or for the purpose of disturbing people."' Because these mens rea
requirements could result in over-punishment and arbitrary law
enforcement,45' the hoax law should be specific enough that
individuals will know whether it applies to them and police are aware
of the limitations of their power.
D. Overly Severe and Disproportional Penalties
After determining the mens rea and actus reus requirements for a
hoax crime, the legislators' next step is to decide how to punish
criminal hoaxes. Some states have attempted to deter this behavior
by imposing a single penalty that does not differentiate among
different types of hoaxes-e.g., jest vs. malice . Other states and the
to others, a hoax weapon of mass destruction commits a felony of the second
degree.").
448. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-109(7) (West 2002) ("Any person who
manufactures or possesses or who gives, mails, sends, or causes to be sent any false,
facsimile, or hoax explosive or incendiary device or chemical, biological, or
radiological weapon to another person or places any such purported explosive or
incendiary device or chemical, biological, or radiological weapon in or upon any real
or personal property commits a class 5 felony.").
449. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166(3) (West 2002) (punishing the offense as a
second-degree felony); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-109(7) (West 2002)
(punishing the offense as a Class 5 felony).
450. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.31 (A) (1) (Anderson 2003) ("No person
shall cause the evacuation of any public place, or otherwise cause serious public
inconvenience or alarm, by doing any of the following: Initiating or circulating a
report or warning of an alleged or impending fire, explosion, crime, or other
catastrophe, knowing that such report or warning is false."); H.R. 2759, 57th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002) (indicating that an individual is guilty of malicious
intimidation or harassment if he or she "maliciously exhibits an imitation, fake, or
hoax.., biological ... substance and who intends to, and does, intimidate or harass
a person").
451. Proving that an individual intended to cause public inconvenience or one of
the other vague intents is an extremely low threshold when the resulting charge is a
felony.
452. See supra Part III (examining state legislation adopting a strict liability
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federal government have recognized the significant difference
between these two mentes reae.453  Examples of how states punish
hoax crimes vary from lengthy 454 and moderate4 55 prison terms to
misdemeanors only.456 Other states have diversified their punishment
schemes. Pennsylvania, for example, provides that an individual is
guilty of: a first-degree misdemeanor if he threatens to use a weapon
of mass destruction or falsely reports the placement of a weapon of
mass destruction; a third-degree felony if this conduct causes the
"occupants of a building, place of assembly or facility of public
transportation to be diverted from their normal or customary
operations"; or a second-degree felony if this conduct takes place at
the time of a state of emergency and the "report or threat causes




Although hoax perpetrators deserve a fitting punishment, many
states have enacted penalties that are too severe to punish a criminal
whose acts could not have resulted in injury or death to the victim.-
standard, according to which all offenders receive the same punishment, regardless
of the hoaxster's mens rea).
453. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 35 (2002) ("Imparting or Conveying False Information")
(providing a maximum civil penalty of $1,000 for imparting or conveying false
information without any intent, under the crimes section of the aircraft and motor
vehicles chapter, versus a five-year prison term or a fine, or both, for imparting or
conveying false information "willfully and maliciously, or with reckless disregard for
the safety of human life").
454. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.543m (West 2003) (providing that an
individual who knowingly makes false reports of terroristic acts will face possible
incarceration for up to twenty years in prison, a $20,000 fine, or both); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.712(4) (West 2003) (allowing up to ten years' imprisonment, a fine of not
more than $20,000, or both, for any individual who, with the intent to terrorize,
displays a "simulated weapon of mass destruction," threatens to use a weapon of mass
destruction, or falsely reports the placement of a weapon of mass destruction).
455. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11418.1 (West 2003) (providing that any individual who
"gives, mails, sends, or causes to be sent any false or facsimile of a weapon of mass
destruction to another person.., with the intent to cause another person to fear for
his or her own safety, or for the personal safety of others," and thereby causes the
individual to be placed in "sustained fear," will face up to one year in the county jail,
or sixteen months, or two or three years, in the state jail, and a fine of up to
$250,000).
456. See, e.g., H.B. 263, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002) (providing that a person
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if he or she "manufacture [s], possess[es],
transport[s], or distribute[s] a hoax device or replica of a... biological weapon with
the intent to cause another to reasonably believe that the hoax device or replica...
is a... biological weapon").
457. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2715 (2003).
458. See Mike Hoyem, Inmate Who 7ried to Mail Fake Anthrax Gets 20 Years, NEWS-
PRESS (Fort Myers, Fla.), Oct. 9, 2002, at 3B (stating that Cory T. Perry, a Lee County,
Florida inmate, was sentenced to twenty years in prison when he tried to mail letters
laced with Metamucil and bearing the phrase "Time to Die Today" to Lee County
businesses and New York syndicated columnist "Miss Manners" while he was in jail on
other charges); Ronson, supra note 12, at 16 (reporting the story of Northern Illinois
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In Minnesota, for example, hoaxsters face a prison sentence of up to
ten years, a fine of up to $20,000, or both. 9  In Michigan, a
perpetrator of a terroristic threat or false report could be imprisoned
for up to twenty years, fined up to $20,000, or both.4 60  These
penalties seem especially severe when viewed in comparison to a
recent anthrax hoax case in England in which the perpetrator was
461sentenced to 100 hours of community service.
However, the punishments facing perpetrators in states without
hoax biological weapon statutes are even more extreme. For
instance, Dean Wilber faces a maximum sentence of life in prison for
sending a fake anthrax letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft.462
But the heaviest sentence by far awaits Clay Waagner, the
"undisputed anthrax king."4 63 Waagner faces a several-thousand-year
sentence-which might be the longest sentence in United States
history-mostly for sending more than 700 letters laced with fake
anthrax to abortion clinics. 4  Waagner has stated that he feels his
anthrax hoax crusade was highly successful because it cost him less
than $300 and, according to his own estimates, 2,300 babies were not
aborted due to his attacks.6 Such an extreme sentence is not
warranted for someone who did not kill anyone, especially
University Student Bryan Magnall, who was expelled and faces up to five years
incarceration after being charged with aggravated battery and disorderly conduct for
running around campus on Halloween wearing a cape, waving a manila envelope of
flour, and shouting, "Free anthrax! Get it while it's cheap!"; the charge was upgraded
to "aggravated" because he was wearing a mask during the time of the assaults).
459. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.712(4) (West 2003). Similar legislation exists in
Oklahoma and Vermont. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1268.4 (West 2003)
(providing a maximum state prison term of ten years, restitution to the victim, and
reimbursement of emergency response costs for individuals who commit terrorism
hoaxes); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3502(g) (2003) (punishing individuals who place
hoax weapons of mass destruction with up to five years' incarceration, a maximum
fine of $10,000, or both).
460. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.543m (West 2003).
461. See Ronson, supra note 12, at 16 (reporting that the hoaxster was a kitchen
worker in Bath who placed sugar in an envelope for the chef).
462. See Matthew B. Stannard & Chuck Squatriglia, Anthrax-hoax suspect held in
Oakland, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 2002, at Al (stating that the greeting card filled with
baby powder that Wilber mailed from Laramie, Wyoming with a one-cent stamp
broke open in a post office in Cheyenne, Wyoming).
463. See Ronson, supra note 12, at 16 (stating that the prosecution's goal was to
give him a number of years for each hoax that he committed). Waagner's prior
convictions included weapons violations, escaping from jail, and committing robbery
at a gas station. Id.
464. See id. (indicating that 300 of the letters contained the nontoxic chemical
"BT," which has the same biological composition of anthrax-meaning that tests for
anthrax could yield a positive result).
465. See id. (relating Waagner's statement that he was prompted to commit the
hoaxes after his daughter suffered a miscarriage, which was when he claimed God
said to him, "How can you grieve over this one when millions are killed every year
and you do nothing?").
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considering the fact that his sentence will be greater than that served
by serial killers and mass-murderers.
A few states punish hoaxes more severely than terroristic threats
and false reports without explaining why one is considered more
466serious than the others. States also punish offenses
disproportionately from case to case. For example, Terry Olson of
Utah faces up to life in prison without parole for lacing anthrax
letters with Nesquik and sugar at his house and reporting to
authorities that he received them in the mail.467 In contrast, Lucy
Manifold, a sixth grade teacher in Ohio, was removed from her job
and fined $150 after she placed a hoax letter filled with powdered
468lime in the school's outgoing mail tray. Although neither of the
letters was sent in the mail, Manifold actually took a much greater
risk than Olson by attempting to mail the letter and placing it in the
mailroom at school. 469 The only major difference in their stories isthat the FBI was alerted in Olson's case but not in Manifold's. 70
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Introduction
The most effective means of protecting the country from future
hoax crimes requires uniform, nationwide federal legislation.71 State
466. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3502(g) (2003) (providing that the penalty
for placing a hoax weapon is imprisonment for not more than five years, a fine of not
more than $10,000, or both), with id. at § 3503(b)(2) (2003) (providing that the
punishment for threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction is imprisonment for
not more than two years, a fine of not more than $5,000, or both).
467. See Ronson, supra note 12, at 16 (quoting Terry Olson's lawyer, Ron Yengich,
as stating: "[I]t's really difficult to go after the real perpetrator of the anthrax
crimes. We use the criminal law to scapegoat a lot in the U.S.... But contrary to
what the assistant U.S. Attorney has said, he didn't 'wreak havoc in his community,'
nor did he 'scare the entire state of Utah."').
468. See id. (stating that Manifold attempted to send the letter to her brother, with
whom she frequently played practical jokes; the powdered lime was accompanied by
a note that said, "From your new friend Bin!").
469. If Manifold's letter had opened while school was in session and she could not
be located, the entire school might have been evacuated and emergency personnel
might have been called to the scene. In addition, if the letter had been placed in the
mail and some of the lime had seeped out in a post office, the post office most likely
would have been shut down and workers would have been treated with Cipro.
Further, her brother could have been terrorized if he did not realize that the letter
had been a joke from his sister. Conversely, other than inconveniencing emergency
response personnel and adding to the national anthrax-hoax furor, Olson's hoax did
not involve any victims or possible second-party victims, other than himself.
470. See Ronson, supra note 12, at 16 (stating that, in Manifold's case, the principal
alerted only the local police, whereas in Olson's case the Hazardous Materials Team
was sent to his house, followed by the F.B.I. the next day).
471. Although federal legislation is the optimum solution, uniform state laws are
the next best option. Consequently, the recommendations made in this section
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hoax laws based on a model statute would be subject to fifty different
interpretations by state courts, and some states might not adopt the
statute in its entirety472 -or at all. Adopting a single federal statute
would also reduce the problems with disproportional punishments• •473
that currently exist due to prosecution at the state level. In
particular, the federal government must consider the actus reus and
mens rea that ought to be criminally culpable, the penalties for such
crimes, and the potential defenses to criminal charges under the new
statutes.
Predicting what shape and form future hoax crimes will take is
paramount to drafting effective hoax crime legislation.47 4 Congress
must carefully decide what acts should be punished, because a
sweeping bill might criminalize otherwise innocuous or equivocal
activity475-in other words, conduct that harms neither the individual
nor society. 47  It is a delicate balance, however, for too much
precision could allow some hoaxsters to go unpunished.
Moreover, enacting legislation without properly identifying what
Congress specifically seeks to deter could create vagueness
477problems. Because this is an emerging area of criminal regulation,
legislative drafters must focus on what they want to criminalize and
whether the civil or administrative regime outside the criminal justice
system should handle the matter. A failure to answer these questions
could create tyrannical laws that would not differentiate between
harmless jokes and malicious assaults, thereby undermining the
legitimacy of future regulation.
apply equally to the federal and state governments.
472. See Coyle, supra note 304, at Al (stating that, although the Emergency Health
Powers Act, which is a model bioterrorism response law, has been introduced in
thirty-six states and enacted by eighteen states and the District of Columbia, only
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, and the District of Columbia have adopted the full version
of the law).
473. See supra Part IV.D (discussing problems with the "overly severe and
disproportional penalties" imposed by current state hoax legislation).
474. See supra Part I (discussing the variety of methods that anthrax hoaxsters have
used to consummate their hoaxes following September 11).
475. See State v. Schmailzl, 502 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Neb. 1993) (stating that
Nebraska's terroristic threats statute is constitutional because it does not violate the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of overbreadth, which is implicated when "a
sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill
the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
476. See, e.g., Pedicini, supra note 264, at DI (stating that, although the boy who
spilled the Kool-Aid in the school bathroom has already been charged with
disrupting an educational institution, which is a misdemeanor, he could face second-
degree felony charges for possessing a hoax weapon of mass destruction).
477. See supra Parts III.A, 1V.A (examining void-for-vagueness challenges involving
hoax crime legislation).





It is essential for Congress to define succinctly the precise conduct
it aims to criminalize. Otherwise the government risks the
appearance of prosecuting without specific direction, instruction, or
limits on prosecutorial discretion. Lumping vague definitions into
legislation could also require judicial interpretation to actually
"make" the law, potentially resulting in inconsistent rulings across the
country.
Wisconsin's attempted approach to hoax crimes was well-conceived
criminal legislation because it had the foresight to define three
distinct incarnations of the criminal hoax: false reports, hoax crimes,
and terroristic threats. 479  The Kansas Legislature built on this
480
foundation with an approach that provides several advantages.
First, the legislature drafted the statute in plain language that
requires only minimal judicial interpretation to effectuate the aims of
the statute.48' Instead of relying on statutory language that may
become bogged down in its own textual ambiguity 482-such as
to play a prank on their friends by placing letters containing fake anthrax in their
mailboxes could now become wards of the state). Although the boys' joke was in
poor taste, separating them from their parents for committing a hoax that resulted in
no real harm to anyone is a punishment far too severe a deterrent for the crime.
Such an extreme punishment is likely to result in a loss of public support for the
government's goal of prosecuting hoaxsters to the fullest extent of the law.
479. See S. 363, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2002) (indicating that the bill failed to
pass in the Senate, "pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 1").
480. Kansas proposed two bills that, when combined, provide a complete and
effective legislative solution for addressing anthrax hoaxes. See S.B. 594, 79th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002) (penalizing terroristic threats and false reports); H.B. 2986,
79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002) (addressing false reports of weapons of mass
destruction and hoaxes involving biological weapons of mass destruction).
481. See Kan. S.B. 594 (defining false reports as "communicating by any means of
communication to any person or group of persons, a report, knowing or having
reason to know the report is false, that causes any person to reasonably believe that
there is located at any place or structure whatsoever any... biological... weapon of
mass destruction"). The bill defines terroristic threat as "any threat to commit the
crime of terrorism causing reasonable expectation or fear of imminent commission
of such offense." The bill defines terrorism as "the commission of, the attempt to
commit or conspiracy to commit any felony with the intent to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of government or affect the
conduct of a unit of government." See Kan. H.B. 2986 (providing that a false report is
committed in the same manner as delineated by Kan. S.B. 594; also providing that a
weapon of mass destruction hoax is committed by "concealing, placing or displaying
any device, object, machine, instrument or artifact, with intent to perpetrate a hoax,
causing any person to reasonably believe such device, object, machine, instrument or
artifact to be a... biological... weapon of mass destruction").
482. Cf., e.g., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE UNITED STATES ATroRNEYS' MANUAL, TITLE
9, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL No. 2402 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that the
ambiguity in the Hobbs Act has allowed it to be interpreted and applied in ways that
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defining what constitutes a weapon of mass destruction-the statute
clearly explains the prohibited conduct. 4 3 Second, the breadth of the
Kansas statute covers three distinct offenses that have been associated
with hoax crimes post-September 11: false reporting, use of hoax
weapons, and terroristic threats. 4  Third, by creating distinct
provisions for the different crimes associated with criminal hoaxes, it
portrays a regime that is not aimless, overly vague, or ill-defined.
2. Weapons of mass destruction definition for the three acti rei
An effective hoax statute must clearly and succinctly define
"weapons of mass destruction" and "hoax weapons of mass
destruction." An effective approach would be to define the former as
"any device that uses radiological, biological or chemical agents or
nuclear materials to cause harm" and the latter as "any replica or
facsimile of a weapon whose likeness is such that a reasonable person
would perceive the weapon to be a real weapon of mass
destruction. 4 5 Adopting a definition that is broad enough to include
any device that a reasonable person would perceive to be a real
weapon of mass destruction allows the statute to apply to the use of
later-developed types of weapons of mass destruction that legislators
presently are unable to anticipate. This is necessary to avoid the
problems that some states now face when prosecuting anthrax
hoaxsters under hoax statute definitions that are limited to facsimile
bombs. s6
make little sense when considering the original purpose and intent of the Act),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/itle9/
crm02402.htm. The main thrust of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, is that it"prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign
commerce 'in any way or degree."' Id. Additionally, the Act outlaws robbery and
extortion conspiracies, but fails to refer to 18 U.S.C. § 371, the general federal
conspiracy statute. Id. The Hobbs Act provision that proscribes "physical violence to
any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section," relates only to violence that serves to further the
commission of a robbery or extortion. Id. However, in United States v. Franks, 511
F.2d 25, 31 (6th Cir. 1975), the court disagreed with the proposition that the statute
prohibits "all physical violence obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce as
contrasted with violence designed to culminate in robbery or extortion." Id.
Furthermore, even though the original purpose of the Act was to decrease
racketeering in labor-management disputes in the 1940s, the extortion statute is
often employed in cases of "public corruption, commercial disputes, and corruption
directed at members of labor unions." Id. Even so, finding a violation of the Hobbs
Act does not necessitate "proof of 'racketeering."' Id.
483. See supra note 481 (defining the crimes prohibited by Kansas' legislation).
484. See id.
485. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § A.
486. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 1969, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (enacted) (providing
penalties for biological weapon threats, terroristic threats, false public alarms, and
placement of "false or facsimile bombs," without mentioning hoax weapons of mass
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3. False reports actus reus
The actus reus that should be proscribed for false reports is to
"falsely report the location or placement at any place or structure of a
weapon of mass destruction."48 7 This actus reus is broad enough to
cover any type of false report, whether the person places the fake
anthrax himself or herself and then reports its location or reports
that someone else has exposed him or her to anthrax although the
individual knows this to be false. This type of language, modeled
after the proposed Alabama legislation, would differentiate those who
create hoax devices from those who report their existence. This is
an important difference, particularly in the context of recent anthrax
hoaxes in which the "manufacture" of hoax devices might amount to
nothing more than the placement of flour in an envelope.4 9 In
addition, the lack of specified locations for the perpetration of false
reports eliminates potential loopholes that could be created in
legislation that details false report locations with extreme
particularity.
490
4. Hoax crime actus reus
Determining which acts should be considered criminal hoaxes
poses a difficult problem due to the degree of unpredictability
accompanying hoaxes.48' Unlike simple assault, whose statutes focus
on the immediacy of the harm to the victim, 49 2 criminal hoaxes place
destruction).
487. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § B.1.
488. Compare H.B. 263, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 7(a) (Ala. 2002) (requiring that the
offender "manufacture, possess, transport, or distribute" the hoax device), with id. §
7(c) (requiring that the offender "communicate or transmit" that the hoax device is
operational).
489. See, e.g., Lacoe, supra note 39, at 1A (reporting on the arrest of Emily Forman
for placing cornstarch and a blank piece of paper in an envelope).
490. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3502(g) (2003) (providing that a person is
guilty of possession and use of weapons of mass destruction if he or she "knowingly
and intentionally places a hoax weapon in any public place, building, house,
residence, facility of public transport, vehicular conveyance, train, ship, boat, aircraft,
dam or reservoir for storing water"); H.R. 375, 141st Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2002)
(providing that a person is guilty of placing a hoax weapon of mass destruction when
he or she places such a substance "in a building, public place or place of assembly or
facility of public transportation or school, college or university").
491. Legislators may have to keep a generic definition of hoax in order to have a
malleable standard that meets the growing frequency and bizarre incarnations of the
criminal hoax. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1985) (dealing with situations
involving threats to an individual or a group and serving as an example of a
generically written code that might be broad enough to encompass a variety of hoax
situations).
492. See id. § 211.1 (1985) (providing that an individual assaults another when he"attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury").
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the victim in fear because of a harm that might later be manifested,
493such as contracting inhalation anthrax. Because there is no
immediate harm to the victim save the feeling that some harm or
danger will occur in the future, knowing which actions to criminalize
and which to consider pre-existing crimes, like assault, will be a
complicated task. Legislators should look to Kansas for guidance; the
Kansas Legislature created comprehensive, thoughtful criminal hoax
legislation that correctly describes what conduct to punish as
criminal.494
The actus reus that should be proscribed for hoax crimes is to
"conceal, distribute, place, mail, display, or use a hoax weapon of
mass destruction to commit or cause to be committed an act likely to
cause an individual to believe that he or she has been exposed to a
weapon of mass destruction. 495  This actus reus expands on the
Kansas bills by adding the acts of mailing, distributing, and using a
hoax weapon of mass destruction-some of the more common forms
of conduct used to perpetrate hoaxes following September 11.496
Furthermore, it requires conduct that is likely to cause an individual
to believe that he or she was exposed to a weapon of mass
destruction, rather than to believe that the device actually is a weapon
of mass destruction.497 This language would cover situations in which
someone receives a note indicating that he or she has been exposed
to anthrax, regardless of whether real or hoax anthrax accompanies
the note.498
5. Terroristic threats actus reus
The actus reus that should be proscribed for a terroristic threat
should be to "threaten to use a weapon of mass destruction.4 99 I
recommend this language because it creates an offense based on
493. See Kellman, supra note 25, at 433-34 (describing the possible consequences
of coming into contact with anthrax).
494. See supra note 481.
495. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § B.2.
496. Compare H.B. 2986, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002) (including only the acts
of "concealing, placing or displaying" a hoax weapon of mass destruction), with supra
Part I (surveying the variety of hoaxes perpetrated following September 11 that
involved mailing, distributing, or using a hoax weapon of mass destruction).
497. Compare Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-27-12(1) (2003) (providing that it is illegal for
a person to "commit an act intended to cause another person or persons to falsely
believe that [they] have been exposed to a harmful biological substance"), with Kan.
H.B. 2986 (requiring the victim to "reasonably believe" that the hoax weapon is a real
biological weapon of mass destruction).
498. This provision specifically addresses cases in which an individual receives a
threatening letter asserting that he or she has been exposed to anthrax, even though
the victim cannot detect a visible hoax substance.
499. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § B.3.
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making threats alone. This is different from many states' proposed
legislation, which combine terroristic threats with hoaxes and false
reports. 0' Further, this actus reus allows prosecution irrespective of
the location in which the threat is supposed to be consummated.50'
C. Mens Rea
Most importantly, Congress should develop a mens rea standard
based on the defendant's, rather than the victim's, state of mind.
The perpetrator should be just as culpable whether or not the victim
is actually put in fear; the perpetrator should also be liable for scaring
unintended targets.
50 1
1. False reports mens rea
The mens rea that should be proscribed for false reports is the
"intent to threaten, scare, or coerce" the victim receiving the false
report. This mens rea requirement avoids any consideration ofwhether the victim actually felt threatened, scared, or coerced.
2. Hoax crime mens rea
There should be three separate mentes reae for hoax crimes, in
order to cover the intent to terrorize, the intent to scare, and the
intent to perpetrate ajoke.5 °4 Regarding intent to terrorize, the mens
rea that should be proscribed is the "intent to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of government by
intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of
government."5°5 This mens rea best applies to situations in which the
500. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.075(1)(a)-(b) (Banks-Baldwin 2002)
(providing that an individual is guilty of terroristic threatening if he or she makes
false statements about the placement of a weapon of mass destruction or places a
counterfeit weapon of mass destruction).
501. See, e.g., S. 5823, 224th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (separating the offense of
placing a facsimile hazardous substance at a school, public building, or public place
from doing the same at a sports stadium or arena, mass transportation facility, or
enclosed shopping mall, even though both are Class D felonies).
502. Compare Thompson, supra note 161, at A3 (discussing Kinley Gregg's
acquittal, which was influenced in part by the fact that no one was scared by her
hoax), with Neely Tucker, Capitol Police Officer Convicted of Staging Anthrax Hoax, WASH.
POST, Nov. 22, 2002, at A17 (reporting the federal jury conviction of Capitol Police
Officer James Pickett on one felony count of making false statements, even though
no one was frightened by his anthrax hoax).
503. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § B.1.
504. Seeid. §§ B.2(a)-(c).
505. See id. § B.2(a). Virginia recently enacted a hoax statute with a similar mens
rea requirement. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.6(C) (Michie 2003) (prohibiting
placement of a hoax weapon of mass destruction "with the intent to (i) intimidate
the civilian population, (ii) influence the conduct or activities of the government of
the United States, a state or locality through intimidation, (iii) compel the
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hoaxster intends to affect large segments of the population, such as a
city or region, rather than a private individual .
Mentes reae dealing with hoaxes targeting private individuals are
critical due to the number and variety of hoaxes of this type
perpetrated after September 11.5°1 To deal with malicious hoaxes, the
mens rea that should be proscribed is the "intent to threaten, scare,
or coerce."508 This intent is necessary to create a bright line between
perpetrators who intend to frighten their victims and those who
merely act recklessly or perform hoaxes as pranks or practical jokes.
To cover hoaxes made recklessly or in jest, the best provision would
be one that criminalizes hoaxes perpetrated without the "intent to
threaten, scare, coerce, or intimidate an individual or coerce a
civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of government by
intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of
government."50 9 Put simply, strict liability-i.e., the absence of a mens
rea requirement-should be appropriate for all hoax-type offenses
that do not fall within the aforementioned mentes reae, with
punishment in the form of restitution. 50  This catch-all category
allows for prosecution of a hoax with any type of mens rea, including
not only those committed in jest or with recklessness, but also those
perpetrated with a type of mens rea that is not included in the other
segments of the offense. 5
3. Terroristic threats mens rea
The mens rea that should be proscribed for terroristic threats is the
"intent to deceive, threaten, scare, or coerce. 512 This is similar to the
mentes reae recommended for false reports and hoaxes in which the• • 513
perpetrator intends to frighten the ViCtim. "Deceive" is added to
emergency evacuation of any place of assembly, building or other structure or any
means of mass transportation, or (iv) place any person in reasonable apprehension
of bodily harm").
506. See, e.g., Ronson, supra note 12, at 16 (relating the story of Clay Waagner, who
sent approximately 800 anthrax hoax letters to abortion clinics).
507. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 158, at IA (reporting the guilty plea of Mohammad
Yaseen Haider for sending anthrax threats via e-mail to a former love interest);
Shields, supra note 150, at IB (discussing the story of Melinda Rosemarie Smith, a
woman arrested for sending hoax anthrax letters to intimidate her romantic
competitor).
508. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § B.2(b).
509. See id. § B.2(c).
510. See id.
511. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.24 (2001) (requiring hoaxsters to have the
"intent to perpetrate a hoax"). This type of mens rea covers hoaxsters who have an
intent that the legislatures to date have not considered, thereby serving as a "catch-
all" that is needed to cover all hoaxes.
512. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § B.3.
513. Seeid. § B.1.
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the mens rea here in order to prosecute hoaxsters who threaten their
victim with the hope that he or she will actually believe that the threat
will be consummated rather than just fear that it might happen.
5 14
D. Penalty
As previously described,"' many states have overcriminalized
hoaxes after the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the ensuing
anthrax scares. The result is that many people who committed
hoaxes in jest face serious jail or prison time. While some
punishment is appropriate for those individuals, severe punishment
may go too far.516
The only way to ensure that the punishment is proportional to the
517crime is to base criminal liability on the perpetrator's mens rea.
False reports should be punished more harshly than hoaxes because
the perpetrator always risks and usually intends an emergency
518response. Terroristic threats should face the most severe
punishment because the perpetrator threatens to use an actual
weapon rather than a hoax weapon.
Violators of any of the three offenses-including those who act
jokingly or recklessly5 1 59-should be strictly liable to any government
entity for payment of restitution for the costs associated with that
entity's actions in response to the hoax and to any person or
company for the actual value of any goods, services, income, or
property value lost as a result of the hoax. If anyone is seriously
injured or killed as a result of the hoax, offenders should be
514. See, e.g., H.R. 7986, 2002 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2002) (requiring perpetrators of
false reports to cause the victim to experience "anxiety, unrest, fear, or personal
discomfort").
515. See supra Part IV.D.
516. See id. (comparing the various punishments for different types of hoaxsters,
some of which are appropriate and some of which are overly severe).
517. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-808(a) (2002) (requiring that the hoaxster
employ a hoax substance "that is intended to, or that such person has reason to
believe may, create a fear or apprehension on the part of any other person that such
substance may be a biological warfare agent").
518. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-730 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (punishing the
manufacture of a hoax device with imprisonment for not more than one year and a
fine not more than $10,000, or both, and the communication to another "that a
hoax device or replica is a destructive device" with imprisonment "not less than two
years nor more than fifteen years"); id. § 16-23-750 (punishing an individual's first
conviction for conveying false information with a prison term of not less than one
year nor more than ten years, and an individual's second offense with a prison term
of not less than five years nor more than fifteen years).
519. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1268.1(3) (West 2003) ("'Terrorism hoax'
means the willful conduct to simulate an act of terrorism as a joke, hoax, prank or
trick against a place, population, business, agency or government . .
520. See infra PROPOSED STATUTE § C.1.
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sentenced to a term of years-perhaps up to ten years for causing
serious injury and up to life for causing death-in addition to the
prescribed penalty for each individual offense.
E. Defenses to Hoax Crime Prosecution: Impossibility and Mistake
5 22
By nature, a hoax is not physically harmful to an individual but
rather deceives the mind or creates an apprehension of something
that is not real.523 Criminalizing otherwise innocuous or equivocal
actions remains a distinct possibility unless legislators are aware that
proposed hoax legislation proscribe conduct that could not cause
harm. As such, impossibility might be raised as a defense because of




In classic impossibility cases, case law does not allow impossibility to
be a viable defense in situations in which the perpetrator would have
been able to complete his crime, had the circumstances been what
the perpetrator intended. 25  In contrast, many prank hoaxsters
neither intended to harm any individual nor wanted to put the
person in immediate fear for his or her life.5 2 ' How, then, can
impossibility be factored into the equation when drafting hoax crime
legislation?
The Fourth Circuit has held that impossibility should not be a
concern when federal statutes focus on the harm perceived by the
intended victim.5 2 7 Adopting a mens rea requirement that focuses on
521. Seeid. §§ C.2-3.
522. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The Emerging Consensus,
23 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 377 (1986) (discussing the nuances of the impossibility defense
to attempt crimes); John S. Strahorn, Jr., The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts,
78 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1930) (examining some of the classic examples of the criminal
attempt and what to make of criminalizing situations that cannot be consummated
due to impossibility).
523. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1075 (1993) (defining "hoax" as
"to trick into believing or accepting or doing something[;] play upon the credulity of
so as to bring about belief in or acceptance of what is actually false and often
preposterous").
524. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 11.5(a), at 596-98 (4th ed. 2003)
(providing an overview of the impossibility doctrine, showing that impossibility is a
viable defense if it negates the intent element of a crime). However, impossibility is
not a defense to a crime if, had the facts been as the criminal defendant perceived
them, he would have been able to successfully commit his intended act. Id. §
11.5(a), at 598-600. For example, if but for the fact that a gun were unloaded the
criminal defendant would have murdered his intended victim when the criminal
defendant places his gun to the temple of the victim, that criminal defendant can
nonetheless be charged with attempted murder since, had things been the way he
perceived, he would have been successful in carrying out his crime. Id. See generally
Robbins, supra note 522, at 380-88.
525. SeeLAFAVE, supra note 524, at § 11.5(a); Robbins, supra note 522, at 380-88.
526. See supra Part I (reviewing a variety of hoaxes committed in circumstances in
which the perpetrator did not intend harm to the victim).
527. See United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 880-84 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
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the mind of the victim, rather than on the mind of the perpetrator,
might alleviate any concern about potential impossibility defenses to
committing a hoax. For reasons previously discussed,5 28 however, the
mens rea should not focus solely on the victim's mindset, but rather
use it only to determine the appropriate penalty. Moreover,
impossibility should be unavailable as a defense to hoax crimes for
one fundamental reason: questions regarding the defense of
impossibility arise in cases of inchoate liability, such as attempt,
solicitation, and conspiracy; as a separately delineated harm, a
criminal hoax is not inchoate but rather is actually consummated. 9
Because the fulcrum of many hoax crime bills depends on the
victim's perception, impossibility will probably not be an affirmative
defense for those who commit hoaxes on others.5'0 However, one
situation in which impossibility may play an interesting role in
interpreting hoax crime legislation is when a hoax is committed
against someone who has knowledge that the substance is a hoax and
not a true weapon of mass destruction. If a criminal hoax statute
takes into account the reasonable perception of the victim when
deciding criminal liability for an alleged anthrax hoax, then some
might argue that the impossibility of perceiving the weapon as real,
because the victim had actual knowledge of the nature of the hoax,
could provide a means for exculpation. This argument should fail,
however, for this case would fall into the category of factual
531impossibility, which typically is not a good defense to a crime.
Another interesting scenario might occur when an individual,
thinking that a substance is talcum powder, mistakenly places anthrax
that a dysfunctional homemade mail bomb was a "dangerous weapon" within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b), both because the law may assume that a bomb is
always dangerous and because its display instills fear in the average citizen). But see
People v. Campbell, 532 N.E.2d 86, 88 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that "one cannot have
the specific intent to cause an unintended injury," which points to a viable
impossibility defense regardless of the intent requirement as long as the injury itself
was unintended). This raises an interesting issue about how a court could rationalize
an impossibility defense when the mens rea requirement merely required intent to
deceive, because even if the individual did have the intent to deceive with a hoax
weapon, the injury-including fright, hazmat clean-up, etc.-may be far from
intended, although foreseeable.
528. See supra Part III.C.2.
529. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 9-34
(1989) (defining other inchoate crimes and distinguishing them from substantive
crimes).
530. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1268.1(3)(b) (West 2003) (including in its
terrorist hoax provision a requirement that the hoaxster's conduct must "cause[]
fear, intimidation or anxiety and a reasonable belief by any victim that such act or
threat is an act of terrorism to disrupt any place, population, business, agency or
government").
531. See Robbins, supra note 522, at 380-88.
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on someone's desk. Although this would not be a hoax situation,
since the perpetrator is dealing with actual anthrax, albeit
unknowingly, he or she could still be prosecuted under many of the
terroristic threat statutes that merely require a threat to terrorize.52
The Model Penal Code describes a terroristic threat as committing
"any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause
evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public
transportation, or to otherwise cause serious public inconvenience. 5 3
While this scenario might seem unlikely, it supports the inclusion of
the terroristic threat portion of the proposed legislation because it
prevents defendants from successfully raising a mistake defense.
If a statute has a strict mens rea requirement of specific intent, a
scenario involving real anthrax may trigger the mistake of fact
defense. Model Penal Code § 2.04(1) (a) provides that ignorance or
mistake of fact or law is a defense when it negates the existence of a
mental state essential to the crime charged.5 4 Therefore, drafting the
terroristic threat section of hoax crime legislation with a requirement
that the individual intends to use a weapon of mass destruction may
encourage the use of a mistake of fact defense for the individual who
believes that he or she is using talcum powder (or some other lawful
substance) but really uses anthrax. To deal with these circumstances,
I suggest that the model hoax crime statute consider the intent
requirement as to the result of the threat rather than regarding the
means by which the individual perpetrates the threat.
CONCLUSION
The criminal hoax is a complex and interesting problem, and state
and federal legislatures are struggling to issue a strong, yet just,
statement regarding how they will punish this activity. Whether it is
with new legislation or amended statutes, the unique challenges that
these turbulent times present to local, state, and federal governments
necessitate that legislatures take into account the real possibility that
society is vulnerable to cataclysmic attacks by those using weapons of
mass destruction. In response, legislatures will be challenged to
532. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-61aa(a)(1) (West 2003) (maintaining
the mens rea requirement of "intent to terrorize" in the statute's provision for
threatening in the first degree).
533. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1985).
534. See id. § 2.04(1) (a) (1985) ("Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law
is a defense if: the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief,




develop laws with the fairness and proportionality that are the
theoretical hallmarks of the American criminal justice system.
This proposed hoax crime legislation signifies the belief that there
is a real difference between hoaxes made in jest and those committed
with malice. Lawmakers may be tempted to forego this fundamental
difference in order to make a strong statement about "terrorism" and
gain political capital in the process. Although threats to the United
States by our enemies have never been so serious, it is only with
justice and compassion that our society perseveres. It is my sincere
hope that these recommendations will live up to that challenge.
PROPOSED STATUTE
A. Definitions. For purposes of this section-
1. A weapon of mass destruction is any device that uses
radiological, biological or chemical agents, or nuclear materials to
cause harm.
2. A hoax weapon of mass destruction is any replica or
facsimile of a weapon whose likeness is such that a reasonable person
would perceive the weapon to be a real weapon of mass destruction,
as defined in section A(1).
B. It shall be unlawful to-
1. Knowingly falsely report the location or placement at any
place or structure of a weapon of mass destruction with the intent to
threaten, scare, or coerce. Those found guilty of this offense will be
subject to a term of imprisonment of not more than - years or a
fine of not more than $_, or both.
2. Knowingly or intentionally conceal, distribute, place, mail,
display, or use a hoax weapon of mass destruction to commit or cause
to be committed an act likely to cause an individual to believe that he
or she has been exposed to a weapon of mass destruction.
a. Those found guilty of violating section B(2) with the
intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the
policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect
the conduct of a unit of government will be subject to a term of
imprisonment of not more than - years or a fine of not more than
or both.
b. Those found guilty of violating section B(2) with the
intent to threaten, scare, or coerce will be subject to a term of
imprisonment of not more than - years or a fine of not more than
or both.
c. Those found guilty of violating section B(2) without the
intent to threaten, scare, or coerce or without the intent to intimidate
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or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of
government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a
unit of government will be subject to payment of restitution as
described in section C (1) or to a fine of $_ if no costs are incurred,
or if restitution is less than $-, to a fine equal to the remainder of
$ minus the restitution amount.
3. Intentionally threaten to use a weapon of mass destruction
with the intent to deceive, threaten, scare, or coerce. Those found
guilty of this offense will be subject to a term of imprisonment of not
more than - years or a fine of not more than $_, or both.
C. Punishment
1. Those found guilty of violating section B(1), B(2), or B(3)
will be strictly liable for payment of restitution to any government
entity of the costs associated with that entity's actions in response to
the hoax, and to any person or company for the actual value of any
goods, services, income, or property value lost as a result of the hoax.
2. If, as a result of any of the above violations, any individual is
seriously injured, those found guilty of the violation will be subject to
a term of imprisonment of not more than - years in addition to the
above-prescribed penalty.
3. If, as a result of any of the above violations, any individual is
killed, those found guilty of the violation will be subject to a term of
imprisonment of not more than __ years in addition to the above-
prescribed penalty.
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